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I. INTRODUCTION
State judiciaries are responsible for the resolution and disposition
of the vast majority of civil and criminal cases in the United States.'
Yet public confidence in the court system has greatly diminished and
continues to wane, and criticism of the quality of individual judges
and the judiciary as a whole is ubiquitous.2 Judges themselves have
evidenced their dissatisfaction by voluntarily doffing their robes and
leaving the bench in ever-increasing numbers.3
The crisis in our judicial system has many causes, but one
recurring theme has been that most judges are ill-prepared for the
challenges, personal and professional, of a judicial career, and many
of them turn out to be ill-suited for the job. On February 16, 2009,
* Copyright (c) 2008, 2009 by Keith R. Fisher. All Rights Reserved. This
article is a synthesis of the author's work to date on the subject of Introductory
Judiciary Education, Small portions of this article were drafted by the author for
inclusion in the Report and Recommendations of the Ohio Bar Association and the
ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence on Introductory Judicial
Education to the ABA House of Delegates and an Amicus Brief filed by the ABA
(of which the author was also the principal draftsman) in the U.S. Supreme Court
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. A substantial portion of this article is derived
from a white paper written by the author for a Symposium on Pre-Judicial
Education hosted by the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and co-
sponsored by the Ohio State Bar and the Standing Committee on Judicial
Independence.
** A.B. Princeton University, J.D. Georgetown University. Of Counsel,
Ballard Spahr LLP, Washington, D.C. Professor Fisher has recently returned to
private practice in his specialty, financial services regulation, after twelve years as
a law professor. Most recently he served as the Reporter for the new ABA 20/20
Ethics Commission and as Reporter for the Judicial Disqualification Project of the
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence. The author would like to express
his appreciation to Roy Schotland, Doreen Dodson, William Weisenberg, and
Konstantina Vagenas for their insights and encouragement and to Franklin Pierce
Law Center, Concord, New Hampshire, for a generous writing stipend.
' According to the National Center for State Courts in Williamsburg, Virginia,
98 percent of all judicial proceedings in the United States occur in state courts. See
National Center for State Courts, Court Administration: Caseflow Management,
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/CourTopics/ overview.asp?topic=CasMan (last
visited Oct. 17, 2009). Justice Breyer has reportedly put the figure at 95 percent.
See Dorothy Samuels, The Selling of the Judiciary: Campaign Cash "in the
Courtroom ", N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at A22.
2 See infra notes 157-189.
3 See infra note 105.
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the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (ABA)
voted overwhelmingly to approve a resolution and recommendation
urging state high courts and state, local, and territorial bar
associations to establish voluntary programs of Introductory Judicial
Education.4 Such programs would enable individuals interested in
serving on the judiciary to obtain, well in advance of any selection or
election process in which they might become involved, a better
appreciation of the role of the judiciary and the myriad of challenges
judges face both on and off the bench. Armed with that education, a
judicial aspirant would be not only better prepared to serve as a judge
but also in a far better position to make an informed decision about
whether to pursue a judicial career in the first place.
This article will consider the concept of Introductory Judicial
Education, its underlying rationale and purpose, and the possible
curricular content of such a program.
II. JUDGING AS A SEPARATE PROFESSION
The word "professionalism," now widely used in discourse about
the condition and future of the legal profession, may conjure different
connotations to different people.' Putting such nuances aside, the
word does denote a certain quality of conduct that is expected by
members of the profession and lay people alike. Applying the
concept of professionalism not just to the bar but to the judiciary as
well seems entirely appropriate, particularly given the increasing
' The Recommendation and Resolution, No. 113, was sponsored by the ABA
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence and co-sponsored or supported by
the ABA Judicial Division, the Lawyers Conference, the National Conference of
Administrative Law Judges, the National Conference of State Trial Judges, the
Appellate Judges Conference, the Ohio State Bar Association, the Mississippi Bar,
the ABA Standing Committee on Client Protection, the ABA Center on Ethnic and
Racial Diversity, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, the National Conference
of Federal Trial Judges, the San Diego County Bar Association, the National
Judicial College, and the American Judicature Society.
"Indeed, it seems clear that the word professionalism means different things
to different people, and it is often used in different ways by the same people,
sometimes at the same time and in the same context." Barry Sullivan & Ellen S.
Podgor, Respect, Responsibility, and the Virtue of Introspection: An Essay on
Professionalism in the Law School Environment, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 117, 121 (2001).
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frequency and severity of attacks on judges6 and on judicial conduct.
These include perennial critiques of judicial sentences7 and orders
granting motions to suppress in criminal cases, petulant (if not
choleric) insistence by former governors George Pataki of New York
and Gray Davis of California that decisions by their judicial
6 The reference here is not to physical attacks, though these too have escalated.
See Jerry Markon, Besieged by Threats, Judges Seek Security [as] Intimidation of
Court Personnel Has Surged Recently, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 2009, at 16 ("[t]he
threats against federal court personnel have more than doubled in the past six years,
from 592 to 1,278"). See, e.g., Amanda Paulson & Patrik Jonsson, How Judges
Cope with Everyday Threats on the Job, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 4, 2005;
Rick Lyman, Focus on Safety for Judges Outside the Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2005, at A 18; Shaila Dewan, Terror in Atlanta: The Overview; Suspect Kills 3,
Including Judge, at Atlanta Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2005, at Al; Sniper
Shoots Judge in Reno Courthouse, CHI. TRIB., June 13, 2006, § 1, at 6. More
recently, a radio commentator was charged with threatening the lives of three
federal judges and was committed for trial on those charges notwithstanding his
claim to First Amendment protection for "rhetorical hyperbole." See Lynne Marek,
Trial Over Death Threats Against Federal Judges Could Test Free Speech Rules
Online, NAT'L L. REv, Nov. 24, 2009.
1 Relatively recent examples are Bill O'Reilly's critiques of Oklahoma judge
Thomas Bartheld (also criticized by Geraldo Rivera) for imposing a one-year
sentence on convicted child molester for rape and sodomy of a five-year old girl,
see Kandra Wells, O'Reilly, Rivera, Take Bartheld, Miller to Task on National TV,
MCALESTER NEWS CAPITAL, June 6, 2009,
http://www.mcalesternews.com/local/local_story_157175737.html, and of Vermont
judges Edward Cashman and David Howard. See Bill O'Reilly, Talking Points: No
Justice in Vermont (Jan. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,243904,00.html.
'A prime example is the notorious 1996 Presidential campaign issue (and
intimidating threats of impeachment) arising from such an order by Judge Harold
Baer in United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 921
F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See generally Alison Mitchell, Clinton Pressing
Judge to Relent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, Judges as
Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at Al; Don Van Natta, Jr., Judges
Defend a Colleague from Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at Bl; R. Eugene
Pincham, Commentary, A New Tyranny Against Judiciary, CHI. TRIB., May 23,
1996, at 30. During this imbroglio, Judge Baer did receive support from his judicial
colleagues within the Second Circuit, who wrote a letter decrying politicians'
public castigation of judges for their opinions and the concomitant threat to the
independence of Article 1H judges. See Second Circuit Chief Judges Criticize
Attacks on Judge Baer, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 1996, at 4.
appointees should reflect gubernatorial views,9 castigation of judicial
consideration of foreign sources of law when interpreting the
Constitution or federal statutes,10 generalized attacks on U.S.
Supreme Court decisions from both sides of the political spectrum as
(with apologies to Tennyson" ) cannon to the right and left of them
volley and thunder,12 generic legislative dyspepsia over instances of
"judicial activism,"l3 legislative threats of jurisdiction stripping,' 4
and, from the lunatic fringe, "J.A.I.L. 4 Judges."" While one would
like to believe that purely political motives16 or fundamental
9 See Juan Gonzalez, Pols Rule Courtrooms: Acting Judges Owe Their Job to
Pataki, Rudy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2000, at 8; Davis' Remarks Leave
Judges'Heads Shaking, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 2, 2000.
o See, e.g., H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004) (disapproving Supreme Court's
use of this technique in cases such as Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) and
Atkins v. Virgina, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)).
" See ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON, The Charge of the Light Brigade (1854), in
TENNYSON SELECTED POETRY 96 (W.E. Williams, ed. 1985).
12 Compare Vincent T. Bugliosi, None Dare Call It Treason, NATION, Feb. 5,
2001, at 11 (criticizing the Supreme Court majority in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000)) with Joan Biskupic, Bork, Uncorked; The Judge Holds the Supreme Court
in Contempt, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1997, at CO1 (highlighting Judge Bork's
criticisms of the Supreme Court).
13 See, e.g., Judicial Activism: Defining the Problem and Its Impact, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, U.S.
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (June 11, 1997); Warren Richey,
Judicial Aftershocks from the Schiavo Case, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 4,
2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0404/pO2s01-usju.html?s=hns;
Judicious Temperament: Retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
Speaks Up Against Political Attacks on Courts, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 16, 2006,
at Bl8.
14 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 57 (1997); Ralph Jimenez,
Judges, Lawyers Decry the Virulence of Attacks on High Courts, BOSTON GLOBE,
N.H. WKLY., Oct. 4, 1998, at 1.
" See Claire Cooper, Bid to Punish Judges Has Eye on State, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Nov. 17, 2005, at A3.
16 See, e.g., Ralph Z. Hallow, Republicans Out to Impeach 'Activist' Jurists,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1997, at Al; The Constitution Project, Report of the
Citizens for Independent Courts Task Force on the Distinction Between
Intimidation & Legitimate Criticism of Judges, Defending Justice: Courts,
Criticism and Intimidation, in UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S
COURTS 121, 146-47 (2000), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/uncertainjustice.pdf.
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differences in deeply-held philosophical or religious beliefs account
for most such fusillades, it cannot be gainsaid that a great many
complaints are, in fact, meritorious (with some potentially rising to
the level of criminal misconduct" ) and keep state judicial conduct
commissions in business.' 8
Invoking professionalism with respect to the judiciary raises the
question whether "judging" can be regarded as a separate profession
from "lawyering." Taking an essentially instrumentalist approach to
defining what constitutes a profession, courts have identified certain
salient characteristics, including, at a minimum, formal training,
licensing standards, and enforceable ethics codes.' 9 As the New York
Court of Appeals has observed:
A profession is not a business. It is distinguished by the
requirements of extensive formal training and learning,
admission to practice by a qualifying licensure, a code of ethics
imposing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond those
that prevail or are tolerated in the marketplace, a system for
discipline of its members for violation of the code of ethics, a
duty to subordinate financial reward to social responsibility, and,
notably, an obligation on its members, even in non-professional
" See, e.g., Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of Judicial Corruption: Extortion and
Bribery, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1231 (1997). Cf Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan
I. Edelstein, Prosecuting Judges for Ethical Violations: Are Criminal Sanctions
Constitutional and Prudent, or Do They Constitute a Threat to Judicial
Independence?, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727 (2006).
8 See infra notes 150-180 and accompanying text. See also Geoffrey P. Miller,
Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 432-56 (2004).
Civil suits against judges are more problematic because of judicial immunity.
Recently, two Luzerne County, Pennsylvania judges were accused of taking
kickbacks in return for sending juveniles to privately owned detention facilities. A
federal court ruled that one of the judges was immune from damages for the vast
majority of his conduct, as it occurred inside a courtroom, while the other judge,
whose actions were more administrative in nature, such as signing a placement
agreement with the detention center, did not enjoy immunity. See Ashby Jones,
New Lawsuits Try to Pierce Shield of Judicial Immunity, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12,
2009.
19 E.g., Hosp. Comp. Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351, 1361
(D.N.J. 1992).
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matters, to conduct themselves as members of a learned,
disciplined, and honorable occupation.20
For their part, social scientists have also endeavored to identify
the principal characteristics that distinguish professions from other
occupations. These include:
* a substantial body of knowledge, essential to
performing the tasks of the occupation and requiring
mastery of abstract concepts and complex principles
unfamiliar to the population at large;
* self-regulation by means of established and
enforceable standards for ethical behavior of practitioners;
* self-regulation of the conditions and content of the
work performed, providing a high level of individual
autonomy;
* a culture emphasizing a strong and enduring level
of dedication to the work;
* identification with the occupation by practitioners
and a sharing of common interests and values;
* a motivational ideal of service to clients and the
public: While a business chiefly seeks financial profit, a
profession is mainly concerned with the ideal of service.2 1
"Judging," it should be noted, encompasses all of these except
formal training and learning beyond and different from what is
required for admission to the practice of law, i.e., prior education or
credentialing that is peculiar to the task of being a judge.
The foregoing array of formal characteristics-particularly the
educational requirements, licensing requirements, and ethical code-
engenders a degree of trust and dependency that creates the fiduciary
obligations said to be owed by professionals to their clients and, to a
2ln re Estate of Freeman (Lincoln Rochester Trust Co. v. Freeman), 311
N.E.2d 480 (N.Y. 1974).
21 See RONALD M. PAVALKO, SOCIOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSION
19-33 (2d ed. 1988). Omitted from this enumeration, because it is not germane to
the topic of this essay, is a darker, corollary characteristic of a profession-that of
being a cartel, able to monopolize the provision of a particular type of service. See
RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 17-30 (1986).
105
Spring 2011 Education for Judicial 
Aspirants
106 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
degree, the public as well.22 In the case of judges, that duty translates
into obligations of fidelity to the law, integrity, fairness, impartiality,
and adherence to a quasi-Aristotelian notion that like cases will be
treated alike. Whether judicial selection is made by election or
appointment, "there is an implied covenant with the people that the
judges selected will be persons who have demonstrated by well-
defined and well-recognized qualifications their fitness for judicial
office"-a covenant that includes "find[ing] persons .. . qualified by
learning, experience and temperament, to decide the cases that come
before them impartially and in accordance with the law."23
The vast majority of people serving in the judiciary have no
special credentials for the judicial role that set them apart from
lawyers in general. Thus, other than a law school education, bar
passage, and some amount of experience in the practice of law
(typically, though not always, as litigators), there is no special
training given to those who aspire to judicial office prior to their
ascendancy to the bench.24
In recent years, suggestions have been made for a special
curriculum for individuals aspiring to judicial office. Under the aegis
of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Judicial
Independence ("SCJI" or the "Committee"), 25 a Study Group on Pre-
22 See Richard A. Glaser & Leslee M. Lewis, Redefining the Professional: The
Policies and Unregulated Development of Consultant Malpractice Liability, 72 U.
DET. MERCY. L. REV. 563, 573-80 (1995).
23 James J. Alfini and Jarrett Gable, The Role of the Organized Bar in State
Judicial Selection Reform: The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REv. 683, 701
(2002).
24 A variety of programs are offered for those who are already judges. Some
prominent examples are (1) the courses developed and offered by the National
Judicial College in Reno, Nev. (principally targeted at state trial and family court
judges), see generally The National Judicial College, http://www.judges.org (last
visited Nov. 15, 2009), and (2) those offered in an orientation program for new
federal judges offered by the Federal Judicial Center (principally covering civil and
criminal trial practice, case management, judicial ethics, opinion writing, and (for
district judges and magistrate judges) the criminal sentencing process, as well as
discrete areas of substantive law that arise frequently in federal practice), see THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FOR THE U.S. FEDERAL
COURTS, at 2, available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/FJCEdRes.pdf/$file/FJCEdRes.pdf.
25 The Standing Committee on Judicial Independence has taken a leadership
role in promoting public trust and confidence in the judiciary as well as in the
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Judicial Education-which is now called "Introductory Judicial
Education" or "IJE"2 6-was empanelled in 200127 and in 2005 issued
a brief but interesting report.28 The idea of IJE is that some sort of
formal preparation, while neither a prerequisite for judicial office nor
a guarantee of selection, will result in a cadre of potential jurists who
have exhibited the interest and the commitment to acquire an extra
educational credential that potentially could make them better
qualified for the judiciary than other lawyers.
As part of this effort, the Study Group necessarily had to address
the issue whether the effectiveness and perception of legitimacy of
justice system more generally, including such recent efforts as the DVD video
program. Protecting Our Rights, Protecting Our Courts, the pro-judicial
independence pamphlets Countering the Critics, Countering the Critics II, and
Rapid Response to Unjust and Unfair Criticism of Judges, and the Least
Understood Branch project.
26 Born, no doubt, of a classical education, but influenced further by a culture
in which sound bytes are everything, the author's initial reaction to the term "Pre-
Judicial Education" was decidedly unfavorable. One is simply asking too much of
that little hyphen, and it can't bear the load! For whether or not one ends up, as a
substantive matter, being a proponent of some sort of special education for aspiring
judges, the term "Pre-Judicial" smacks too much of "prejudicial"; indeed, that is
the Latin etymology of words such as "prejudicial" and "prejudice," and from a
psychological perspective there is a strong possibility that the host of negative
contemporary connotations attached to those words, not only in legal discourse
specifically but also in modem English usage generally, would subconsciously
damn the concept before it even gets a fair hearing. That, after all, is the essence of
what it means to be "prejudicial"-with or without the hyphen.
The alternative, "ante-judicial," is no better, not merely because it sounds a bit
precious, rather like "ante bellum"-redolent as that is with mental visions of
plantations and privileged persons sipping mint juleps on honeysuckle-scented
verandas-but also because it suffers from the potential of homonymous confusion
with "anti-judicial," a category of sentiment that is, as noted above (see supra notes
6-16), already far too prevalent in our society.
Accordingly, though begging the reader's indulgence for this footnote, the
author intends to use the phrase "Introductory Judicial Education" or its acronym
"IJE" to describe any and all possible variations on a curriculum or training
program for individuals who aspire to judicial office, whether trial-level or
appellate, and whether federal, state, or administrative.
27 The Study Group comprised trial and appellate judges, lawyers, judicial and
adult educators, bar association executives, and legal academics.
28 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON PRE-JUDICIAL EDUCATION
(2005) [hereinafter Study Group Report].
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judicial selection might be enhanced through the establishment of a
program of Introductory Judicial Education. This involved
consideration of the form such education might take, how its
availability might affect the pool of potential judges and assist those
responsible for judicial selection, and the potential long-range impact
of such education on the overall functioning of our system of justice.
As the Study Group observed:
What we envision is not the displacement of existing
selection mechanisms, but rather their enhancement by making
available to potential judges educational programs designed to
produce judicial candidates who are better prepared for the role
and who can make a more informed decision regarding whether
a judicial career is appropriate for them. Education of this sort
would prove useful to those responsible for judicial selection-
whether an electorate or an appointive authority-by providing
a significant piece of information regarding the interest level
and aptitude of the candidates. The candidates themselves
would benefit from attaining a better appreciation of the judicial
role. Changes in the nature of law practice and the judicial role
over the past several decades have rendered the gap between
the two activities increasingly large. Lawyers are less able to
appreciate all of what being a judge entails, and the skills
learned in practice are less directly applicable to a judicial role
that now includes a substantial managerial component. Because
of this, we believe that [IJE] programs would also appeal to
practitioners who do not intend to become judges, but who
could benefit from knowing more about judicial roles and
responsibilities....
While we do not believe that [IJE] stands as a cure for all
the problems of judicial selection, we believe that it can
alleviate many of them. For example, candidates who have
undergone [IJE] will be less likely to engage in unethical or
otherwise inappropriate campaign conduct. More generally, as
already suggested, they are likely to be better candidates both
because their education will make them better judges and
because their decision to seek a judgeship will be more
informed. In addition, just as education has traditionally served
as a gateway to opportunity in American society, so can [IJE]
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open judicial careers to those who might otherwise been [sic]
excluded from pursuing them based on, for instance, a lack of
political involvement. In sum, [IJE] presents the possibility of
creating a larger pool of better-prepared potential judges.2 9
The Study Group also identified some possible negative
externalities:
... To the extent that [IJE] involves significant costs, career
interruption, or geographic relocation, some otherwise suitable
candidates are likely to be discouraged from pursuing
judgeships. In addition, there is some reason for concern
regarding whether these effects would fall more heavily on
women and those in public service or other less remunerative
practice areas. These effects are, of course, speculative, but
nonetheless deserve ongoing attention as the concept of [IJE]
moves forward."o
After examining a variety of resources and programs, the Study
Group concluded that "[IJE] presents a viable and valuable avenue
for improving both appointive and elective systems of judicial
selection." 3' Acknowledging that the concept was "largely uncharted
territory," the Study Group suggested certain additional preliminary
steps that might be (but have not, to date, been) taken. These include
compiling "data regarding the specific sorts of information that
would be most valuable to those considering a judicial career," 32
developing data on "the typical background of those who become
state court judges,"3 3 and experimenting with pilot programs.3 4 As a
29 Id. at 4-5.
30 Id. at 5.
31 Id. at 29.32 Id. Both new and experienced judges should be systematically surveyed
regarding what they wish they had known at the outset of their judicial careers. The
practicing bar might likewise be surveyed concerning the perceived strengths and
deficiencies of both new and experienced judges. In addition, because making the
programs useful to practitioners as well as aspiring judges will be critical to their
success, attention must be paid to the bar's views of what its members would find
most useful and interesting. Id.
33 Id. at 29.
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concept, Introductory Judicial Education is largely unobjectionable
and may well merit enthusiastic support from the organized bar,
which has an interest in maximizing the chances that the most highly
qualified individuals will ascend to the bench.35 The devil is in the
details, however. What, for example, would be the intended scope of
such a program? Would it be a relatively short, seminar-like program,
lasting a week or less? Would it be a formal, degree program
requiring a year of full-time study in residence, much like a typical
LL.M. curriculum? What sorts of subjects would comprise an IE
curriculum?
The topic thus rather naturally subdivides itself into two
fundamental questions. Is there a sufficiently strong case to be made
for IJ? If so, what might be envisioned as the substantive
curriculum?
In considering these questions, we have the luxury-and the
challenge-of writing on a nearly clean slate. Canvassing the law
review literature reveals very little of substance on the subject of
judicial education 36 generally and even less on IJE. Indeed, the latter
boasts only two offerings, one by a former Director of the A.B.A.'s
Such data would provide an additional window into the experiential
gaps of the judiciary, and thereby suggest areas of curricular emphasis that
might not be apparent from other studies. In addition, the data might
reveal that there are categories of lawyers who are relatively under-
represented in the judiciary, and perhaps suggest ways in which education
might be shaped to make them more likely to consider becoming a judge.
Id.
34 Id. at 29-30.
Given the novelty of [IJE], it will be critical to begin by taking small
steps. We believe that an appropriate jurisdiction should be identified for
the implementation of a pilot program, the initial design of which should
be such as to permit flexibility to adapt in light of early results. More
generally, we believe that broad experimentation will be necessary to
determine what is workable and useful, and that such experimentation
should be fostered and encouraged. From there, work can begin to develop
generalized standards, and perhaps the formation of an institute devoted
solely to [IJE]. Id.
* Id. at 6. Problems with judicial selection appeared to the Study Group to be
"most acute" at the state level, so its inquiry was limited to the IE for aspirants to
state judiciaries. Id Even conceding the correctness of the protasis, it seems
sensible to assume that if IJE is worthwhile, it will be equally useful to aspirants for
both state and federal judicial office.
6 I.e., continuing education for those who have already ascended to the bench.
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Judicial Division 37 and the other by a judge of the Louisiana Court of
Appeal, Third Circuit.38 Beyond these, the only publication to date
has been the Study Group Report.39
Before turning to the merits of IJE, a few more introductory
observations are in order. The impetus for considering this topic can
be traced back to a lingering unease with judicial selection and the
ongoing (though by now somewhat stagnant) debate over merit
selection. 40 Those concerns date back at least to the era of the
n Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit Selection, 29 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 851 (2002).
3 Marc T. Amy, Judiciary School: A Proposal for a Pre-Judicial LL.M
Degree, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 130 (2002). This article is an adaptation of Judge
Amy's thesis for the degree of LL.M. in Judicial Process at the University of
Virginia School of Law.
* Study Group Report, supra note 28.
40 With 39 of the 50 states relying on some form of election to select judicial
officers, that phenomenon, which dates back to the eighteenth century (see infra
note 41) and took wing with 19th century populist concerns about cronyism in
judicial appointments, is not likely to vanish in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless,
the media occasionally takes the opportunity to editorialize (even in what are
supposed to be news stories) in favor of merit selection. See, e.g., Editorial, Justice
for Sale?, WASH. PosT, Mar. 3, 2009, at A12 ("[S]tates should consider abolishing
judicial elections in favor of an appointment system that distances jurists from
politics and fundraising."); Samuels, supra note 1 (noting "inappropriate judicial
involvement in partisan politics," the "dawn of a grubby new era of multimillion-
dollar campaigns for important state judgeships," and referring with approval to
"state reformers stepping up their call for . . . a switch to a nonelective merit
selection system."). Even justices of the U.S. Supreme Court cannot resist
commenting on the judicial election phenomenon. See Republican Party of Minn.
v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 787 (2002) (noting ABA's historical preference of merit
selection over judicial elections); id. at 782 ("[I]f, as Justice Ginsburg claims, it
violates due process for a judge to sit in a case in which ruling one way rather than
another increases his prospects for reelection, then--quite simply-the practice of
electing judges is itself a violation of due process."); id. at 788-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)(expressing serious reservations about judicial elections generally and
noting concerns about campaign contributions undermining public confidence in
the judiciary).
There is general consensus that the design of the Federal Constitution,
including lifetime tenure and appointment by nomination and
confirmation, has preserved the independence of the Federal judiciary. In
resolving this case, however, we should refrain from criticism of the
State's choice to use open elections to select those persons most likely to
achieve judicial excellence.
Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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drafting of the federal Constitution4' and began to ferment in the
Jacksonian era,42 possibly as a result of populist dissatisfaction with
the appointment of judges perceived to be political cronies of the
party in power, though this is disputed.43 What is undisputed is that
the mid-nineteenth century witnessed a move toward elective
judiciaries in many states,4 followed in the twentieth century by the
realization that the taint of politics is just as strong in elective
regimes as in appointive regimes (and perhaps even stronger). That
realization has come home to roost in recent years with the advent of
significant and highly controversial donations to candidates for
judicial office 45 and 4public perceptions of the implications for
judicial independence.
41 "Judicial elections began in 1789 in Georgia localities, then in 1793 in
Vermont localities, and in 1812 Georgia adopted it for state judges." Roy A.
Schotland, To The Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elections,
39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 1399 (2003) (citations omitted).
42 See, e.g., Luke Bierman, Preserving Power in Picking Judges: Merit
Selection for the New York Court ofAppeals, 60 ALB. L. REV. 339, 342-49 (1996)
(alluding to such historical developments in the context of tracing the evolution of
judicial selection for New York's high court).
43 The choice of elections was not (as myth holds):
[A]n unthinking 'emotional response' rooted in . . . Jacksonian
Democracy" which somehow "assumed that popular election of judges
constituted a radical measure intended to break judicial power through an
infusion of popular will and majority control." On the contrary, the move
to judicial elections was led by moderate lawyer-delegates to increase
judicial independence and stature. Their goal was a judiciary "free from
the corrosive effects of politics and able to restrain legislative power.
Schotland, supra note 41, at 1400 (citing Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on
Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-
1860, 44 HISTORIAN 337 (1983)). See also Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of
Scholarly Explanation for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America,
37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993); David B. Frohnmayer, Who's to Judge?, 58 OR.
ST. B. BULL. No. 2, 9, 10 (1997).
"4See JAMES W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS
97 (1950); Schotland, supra note 41, at 1399-1400.
45 The most recent of these involves campaign support in excess of $3 million
to a West Virginia high court judge from the Chairman and CEO of a corporation
after it had lost a $50 million fraud verdict and while it was preparing to file an
appeal to the same high court. Justice for Sale?, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2009, at
A 12. After winning a particularly contentious election, the judge in question, Brent
D. Benjamin, refused to recuse himself, and with him as Acting Chief Justice, the
court overturned the verdict by a one-vote margin (3-2). Caperton v. A.T. Massey
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Viewed in this context, IJE is perhaps another "take" on merit
selection:47 An effort to maximize the chances that judicial
selection-by any process-will result in a judiciary composed of
competent individuals who are not only philosophically attuned to
the imperatives of fairness and impartiality (both in appearance and
in fact) but capable of performing at a higher level of competence
and efficiency as a result of having received specialized training in
Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, (W. Va 2008), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). The
former West Virginia Chief Justice, Elliott E. Maynard, had finally recused himself
from the case after photographs surfaced of him being wined and dined on the
French Riviera and Monaco by the same CEO; these revelations led to Maynard's
being defeated in the Democratic primary and losing his seat on the court. Ian
Urbina, West Virginia's Top Judge Loses His Reelection Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2008, at A25; Paul J. Nyden, Mining Appeal Moving Along Olson to Argue
Harman Case Before Supreme Court, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL
(WV), May 16, 2008, at 1A. On November 14, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008). The
granting of the writ had been unexpected, because in cases where judges had
refused to recuse themselves in the face of large campaign contributions, the
Supreme Court had previously denied certiorari three times. See Avery v. State
Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1003
(2006); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Wightman, 715 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.
App. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
On June 8, 2009, a closely divided Court, while specifying that its holding was
limited to the extreme facts of the case, held 5-4 that when one with a personal
stake in a particular case has had a "disproportionate influence" in placing the
judge on the case by the magnitude of campaign support when the case was
pending or imminent, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the judge from hearing the case, regardless of whether the judge is or is not actually
biased. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2264-65 (2009). (In the interests of full
disclosure, the author was the principal draftsman of the American Bar
Association's amicus briefs, one at the certiorari stage and one at the merits stage,
filed in the Caperton case).
46 See, e.g., David Goldberger, The Power of Special Interest Groups to
Overwhelm Judicial Election Campaigns: The Troublesome Interaction Between
the Code ofJudicial Conduct, Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment,
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2003); Aman Mcleod, If at First You Don't Succeed: A
Critical Evaluation of Judicial Selection Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499
(2005); Phyllis Williams Kotey, Public Financing for Non-Partisan Judicial
Campaigns: Protecting Judicial Independence While Ensuring Judicial
Impartiality, 38 AKRON L. REV. 597 (2005).
4' For some background on merit selection, see Norman Krivosha, In
Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128 (1990).
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the college of judicial arts and sciences. IJE is not, however, a
panacea for the ills of judicial selection, nor can it be: As with the
choice of judicial selection by election or by appointment, judicial
selection with or without IJE can never be entirely insulated from
partisan politics. 48
III. THE CASE FOR UIE
A. Comparing the Common Law and Civil Law Approaches
Some form of IJE is present in certain civil law systems. Much
could be, and has been, written on this subject. While a detailed
examination is beyond the scope of this article, some summary
observations about a few such systems are offered here. One
fundamental characteristic is worth noting at the outset: These civil
law systems proceed from a set of premises radically different vis-a-
vis the role of the judiciary, and how its members fit into the legal
system overall, from those prevailing in the Anglo-American
common law tradition.
1. Germany
The German system features a path embodying education for
career judges. As is common among European systems, legal
education begins at what in the United States would be the
undergraduate level.49 Legal education in Germany differs radically
from the U.S. model both in the uniformity of the curriculum at
48 Cf LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY 128-30
(3d ed. 1994) (observing that merit selection does not eliminate political
considerations from the process).
49 Stefan Korioth, Legal Education in Germany Today, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 85,
90 (2006).
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German universities and in the degree of governmental regulation,o
at both the federal and state levels.
The Deutsches Richtersgesetz, or German Judges' Law,
prescribes the requirements for the study of law and establishes a
regimen of state testing for aspiring jurists.52 After passing the first
examination, the student must complete a series of training rotations,
each lasting from three to nine months in criminal court, civil court, a
prosecutor's office, an administrative agency, and a practicing
lawyer's office (plus one elective), while simultaneously taking
courses that are taught by judges and civil servants and that focus on
"the analysis of complex, practical cases."53 Thus, a quintessentially
judicial outlook predominates.54 Thereafter, upon passing the second
state examination, the student becomes a Voljurist ("full jurist") and
is eligible to apply for a judgeship. 5 This approach to legal
education, according to Dietrich Rueschmeyer, develops "'a
so Subjects of regulation include, inter alia, periods of study, vacations,
mandatory and elective courses, state examinations, and grading. See David S.
Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany:
Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1795, 1802 (1988) (citing M.
BRAUN, JURISTENAUSBILDUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND 67-113 (1980)).
" Since the founding of the German Reich in 1871, primary responsibility for
oversight of legal education has rested with the states. Nevertheless federal
involvement, starting with the 1877 Court Constitution Act
(Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz), has consistently prescribed the principle of the
Einheitsjuristen ("standardized jurists," i.e., the same qualification for all legal
professions), a bifurcated qualification approach requiring passing two state
examinations, and the notion of "the judge as a model for all jurists." Korioth,
supra note 49, at 88.
52 DEUTSCHES RICHTERGESETZ ("DRiG"), 1972 BGBLI 713, as
amended, § 5 I; Korioth, supra note 49, at 89 n.17 (2006) ("[t]oday's Federal Judge
Act (Deutsches Richtergesetz) stipulates in Section 5 that 'those who finish the
study of legal sciences with the First State Examination and the subsequent
preparatory service with the Second State Examination obtain the qualification for
the office ofa judge."').
* Clark, supra note 50, at 1804.
* The same can be said of the education on the Langdellian model purveyed to
the vast majority of law students in the United States. See Black's Law Dictionary
228 (8th ed. 2004) ("casebook method").
" However, this same curriculum produces prosecutors, government lawyers,
and a broad array of in-house corporate lawyers. Clark, supra note 50, at 1804.
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syndrome fostering civil service orientations and loyalty toward the
State."'56
Originally designed for a small elite, this two-stage system with
its mandatory training requirements now produces in excess of
100,000 law students, 7 about 60 to 70 percent of whom will not
become judges or public prosecutors because the German
government limits the number of civil servants.58 The explosion of
those embarking on judicial and legal careers59 has resulted in a glut
of judges and Rechtsanwalte (practicing attorneys) and an increase in
competition severe enough to affect, negatively, the quality of legal
advice and services being rendered.60
2. France
The French system is somewhat different, embodying not only a
corps of "professional" judges but also a variety of tribunals
employing non-professional judges, many of whom have not
received any formal legal training (e.g., the civil servants who are
judges of the administrative courts, the business people appointed to
the commercial courts, and the miscellaneous lay people who serve
on labor courts).6' Confining ourselves for present purposes to the
56 Id. (quoting DIETRICH RUESCHMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN GERMANY AND IN THE UNITED
STATES 4 (1973)) (quotation omitted).
5 Korioth, supra note 51, at 89 (citing STUDIERENDE AN HOCHSCHULEN
WINTERSEMESTER 2003/2004 FACHSERIE 11 REIHE 4.1- 2004 DSES STATISTISCHEN
BUNDESAMTES, available at
http://www-
ec.destatis.de/csp/shop/sfg/bpm.html.cms.cBroker.cls?cmspath=struktur,
vollanzeige.csp&ID=1014818).
58 Id. (citing STATISTIK JURASTDENTEN, PROFUNGEN, RECHTSANWALTE DER
BUNDESRECHTSANWALTSKAMMER, available at
http://www.brak.de/seiten/08-02.php).
59 Law (or, more specifically, the economic and social value system embodied
in the American legal mainstream of the late twentieth century) has long been one
of the New World's most successful exports, but now it seems that portions, at
least, of the Old World are also uncritically importing our surfeit of lawyers per
capita.
so Korioth, supra note 51, at 89.
61 See John Bell, Principles and Methods ofJudicial Selection in France, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1757, 1760-61 (1988).
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corps of "professional" judges (magistrats), these are career judicial
officers, drawn from law graduates, who by age 28 have
matriculated, based on their performance on a highly competitive
examination, into the Ecole Nationale de Magistrature (National
College of Judges) and have embarked upon a civil service career.62
Comparative law studies have observed the rather formalist
nature of French judicial discourse, which seeks to minimize judicial
power, emphasize the establishment of clear, predictable rules, and
maximize the power of the legislature; these studies have contrasted
those features with the American approach, in which judicial
discourse is more pragmatic (or realist), takes as its point of departure
a recognition of the foibles of the legislature-particularly its
inability to foresee the multifarious legal and factual scenarios that
will challenge, if not confound, the interpretation of statutory law-
and thus empowers judges to preserve the slow, accretive, common-
law case-by-case lawmaking role based on frequently policy-laden
applications of logic and precedent.63
This fundamental difference is perhaps a reflection of the
divergences in Enlightenment thought on the judicial role as between
Montesquieu and the Federalists. Montesquieu saw the power of the
state divided between the executive (the King) and the legislature but
not the judiciary, which he saw as merely effecting the will of the
legislature by application of statutory provisions to particular
disputes.64 From Montesquieu's point of view, the judiciary should be
"invisible et nulle. "I6 This formalistic approach, still evident in the
organization and philosophy of the French judiciary today,66
undoubtedly derives in no small part from French fear of judicial
despotism and the revolutionary reaction against the parlements of
62 Id. at 1759. See also Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice, With One Eye on Re-
Election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at Al.63 See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW (1968); JOHN H.
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1968).
6 MELVYN RICHTER, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF MONTESQUIEU (1977).
65 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 72-
96 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds., 1989).66 See, e.g., RENt DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES &
METHODOLOGY 27 (M. Kindred trans. 1972).
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the ancien regime.67 By contrast, the Federalists, while viewing the
judiciary as weaker than the two political branches, anticipated an
active, central, and essential role for judicial review as protecting not
only the fundamental rights of the people (those guaranteed in the
Bill of Rights) from encroachment by the states, but the rights of the
states and the people from encroachment by the federal
government. 68 As Alexander Hamilton cogently observed, "[t]he
complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution . . . , courts of justice, whose duty it must be
to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution
void."69
67 See Charles Calleros, Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, and Clauses
Pdnales in Contract Actions: A Comparative Analysis of the American Common
Law and the French Civil Code, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 67, 94 (2006); Amalia
Kessler, Book Review: Revisiting the Question of French and American
Difference, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 327, 328 (2006) (reviewing MICHEL DE S.- 0.-
L'E SASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004)).
68 Courts are "the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative
encroachments." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter & Charles R. Kessler, eds. 1999). See generally Keith R. Fisher, Towards
A Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank Preemption of State
Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 981, 1017-23 (2006).
69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter &
Charles R. Kessler, eds. 1999).
In the last eight essays of The Federalist (78-85), written for the
conclusion of the second bound volume, Hamilton dedicated the first six
to the judiciary, which he thought the most important guardian of minority
rights but also the weakest of the three branches of government: "It
commands neither the press nor the sword. It has scarcely any patronage."
He was especially intent that the federal judiciary check any legislative
abuses. In number 79, Hamilton introduced an essential concept, never
made explicit in the Constitution: that the Supreme Court should be able
to review and overturn legislation as unconstitutional. At Philadelphia,
delegates had concentrated on the question of state versus federal courts,
not whether courts could invalidate legislation. Here, Hamilton bluntly
affirmed that "no legislative act ... contrary to the constitution can be
valid," laying the intellectual groundwork for the doctrine of judicial
review later promulgated by Supreme Court justice John Marshall....
Hamilton revered great judges and in [THE FEDERALIST No. 79]
pondered how the most highly qualified people could be recruited and
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3. Japan
Traditionally, Japanese society viewed litigation-and by
extension lawyers and judges-with distaste and not with respect.70
Indeed, until very recently," legal education in Japan was limited to
undergraduate courses of study7 2 and was, in all events, fairly stodgy,
typically featuring large, assembly line 73 lecture courses teaching, in
the abstract, substantive rules of Japanese law and theories of
interpretation of Japanese legal codes without any actual case
analysis or, for that matter, classroom participation by students.74
Those actually aspiring to a career as lawyer, prosecutor, or judge,
while they might take these undergraduate law courses, found them
inadequate for passing the bar and had to enroll, in addition, in
various "cram schools," which entailed years of additional study.7"
Admission to practice faces a bottleneck caused by the
requirement of admission to the Shiho Kenshu Sho, or Legal
Research and Training Institute (LRTI), a two-year training program
retained by the courts. He argued for adequate salaries and against both
age limits and the power to remove judges, except by impeachment.
RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 259 (2004) (citations omitted).
70 See Carl F. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan's
Changing View Toward Litigation, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 769, 798 (2001).
n1 See infra text accompanying notes 82-86.
72 See, e.g., Luke Nottage, Reformist Conservatism and Failures of
Imagination in Japanese Legal Education, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 16, 32
(2001).
73 See Yoshiharu Kawabata, The Reform of Legal Education and Training in
Japan: Problems and Prospects, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 419, 432 (2002) ("Most
students quickly discover that law faculties offer only a series of mass-produced,
impersonal lectures with enrollments that exceed 500 students. Students cannot
pass the National Bar Examination by attending these lectures. So students who
want to become lawyers go to preparatory cram schools and do not bother
attending university classes.").
74 See, e.g., Kohei Nakab6, Judicial Reform and the State of Japan's Attorney
System: A Discussion ofAttorney Reform Issues and the Future of the Judiciary, 10
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 623, 638 (2001) (Yohei Suda trans.) (2001); James R.
Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamanaka, The New Japanese Law Schools: Putting the
Professional into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 303, 309 (2004).
" See Setsuo Miyazawa, Education and Training of Lawyers in Japan-A
Critical Analysis, 43 S. TEX. L. REv. 491, 493 (2002); Edward I. Chen, The
National Law Examination of Japan, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1989), reprinted in
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 298 (Meryll Dean, 2d ed. 2002).
119Spring 2011 Education for Judicial Aspirants
120 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
consisting of rotations between stints in civil and criminal courts and
offices of practicing attorneys in the private bar.76 Funded by the
government and controlled by the Saiko saibansho (the Japanese
Supreme Court) and the private bar,77 the LRTI each year admits
only 1,000 of the approximately 30,000 law graduates taking the bar
examination.78
Typically, Japanese judges will have followed this undergraduate
law degree-cum-cram school route and join the judiciary fresh from
their training at the LRTI.79 The majority are career judgesso who are
perceived negatively by the business community because they lack
business education or work experience and therefore are deemed
incapable of understanding contemporary business and professional
practices.8 1 For these reasons, the business community, acting
through a group known as the Nippon Keidanren (Japanese
Federation of Economic Organizations), 82 has proposed many far-
reaching legal reforms in Japan,83 including specifically, a series of
76 Id. at 299.
n See Eric A. Feldman, Mirroring Minds: Recruitment and Promotion in
Japan's Law Faculties, 41 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 467 (1993).
7 See Gerald Paul McAlinn, Reforming the System of Legal Education: A Call
for Bold Leadership and Self-Governance, 2 AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 15, 17-18
(2001).
7 See George Schumann, Beyond Litigation: Legal Education Reform in
Japan and What Japan's New Lawyers Will Do, 13 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L.
REV. 475, 477 (2006) (citing Miyazawa, supra note 75, at 493).
80 JOHN 0. HALEY, THE JAPANESE JUDICIARY: MAINTAINING INTEGRITY,
AUTONOMY AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 5 (Faculty Working Papers Series, Paper No.
05-10-01) (Oct. 5, 2005), available at
http://law.wustl.edu/Uploaded.Files/Faculty/Haley/TheJapaneseJudiciarySSRN.p
df (noting that approximately three-quarters of the judges appointed from the 1970
LRTI graduating class were still on the bench in 1996).
I See Goodman, supra note 70, at 806.
82 This organization, the successor by merger to the Keidanren (Federation of
Economic Organizations) and the Nikkeiren (Federation of Employers'
Associations), boasts a membership (as of May 28, 2009) comprising 1,295
companies, 129 industrial associations, and 47 regional economic organizations.
See Nippon Keidanren, About Nippon Keidanren,
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/profile/pro001.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
8 THE 21ST CENTURY PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, TOWARD A REVITALIZATION
OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Dec. 22, 1998). The sponsoring organization is a
think tank funded by the Keidanren. The 21st Century Public Policy Institute,
http://www.21ppi.org/english/index.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
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judicial reforms aimed at making access to the courts easier and less
expensive. The goal of these reforms is to create "a civil justice
system better able to state the contours of the legal versus the illegal,
to lessen growing risk exposure, and to promote business planning."84
Among these reforms are (i) that graduate professional schools for
the study of law be established, (ii) that judges be appointed from
among practicing attorneys who are familiar with the contours of
business disputes, and (iii) that future judges undertake training in
non-legal fields, primarily the sciences, in order better to understand
intellectual property cases.8 5 Although the reform process has already
begun, with the opening in 2004 of 68 new graduate schools of law,86
it is far too early to be able to assess the results.
From this necessarily abbreviated tour of three foreign legal
systems with targeted education as a prerequisite for judicial office,
one finds they have little to offer that would recommend adoption of
IJE in the United States. To the extent that a specialized program of
study is designed to create a cadre of judges-a specialized judicial
class, if you will-it is anathema to our legal system. Add to that the
youth and inexperience of those eligible for career judicial positions,
and one finds foreign law programs to be poor role models for
adoption of IJE in the United States.
The vitality of the American common law system is its flexibility
and adaptability to changes in society, technology, and broad legal
trends. To be sure, a fair degree of bureaucratization of the judiciary
has already occurred during the latter half of the twentieth century in
response to a variety of historical and cultural phenomena, including
the emergence of the administrative state, huge escalation in crime,
and an explosion of civil litigation that has largely overwhelmed
' Luke Nottage, Japan's Impending Reform of the Administration of Justice:
Far from Final, 48 ASIAWATCH NEWSL. (CCH), Aug. 2001, available at
http://www.law.usyd.edu.au/-uken/ asiawatch48.htm.
5 Id.
86 See, e.g., Eriko Arita, Sixty-Six Institutions Win Approval to Open US.-Style
Law Schools, THE JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, available at 2003 WL 8610293 at
* 1. The number of schools was subsequently increased from 66 to 68. Ichiko
Fuyuno, Japan Grooms New Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2004, at A18.
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judicial efforts at docket control." Further bureaucratization would
be distinctly unhealthy. In our republican form of government,
bureaucratization of the executive and legislative branches, which
derive their power and legitimacy directly from the will of the
people, has shown a tendency to insulate those officials in a manner
that has impaired their responsiveness to societal problems." In the
case of the judiciary, bureaucratization impairs the ability of judges
to hear all grievances, identify and pay attention to all of the interests
involved, and render timely, reasoned decisions based on existing
laws and precedents. That impairment threatens to corrode the
judicial process itself, which lies at the heart of the legitimacy of the
judicial branch.
B. Fundamental Change in the Role of the Trial Judge
If the experience of foreign legal systems provides no principled
basis for IJE, we must look for one elsewhere. One possibility is
contained in the Report of the ABA Commission on the 21st Century
Judiciary, which suggests that the role of the trial judge has
fundamentally changed. If that is so, then some sort of IJE might
well be advisable in order to adapt judges to their new functions. In
support of the claim of fundamental change in the role of trial judges,
the Report cites the following:
* "The term 'trial judge' is increasingly becoming a
contradiction in terms as fewer cases go to trial in state or
federal courts." 90
8 See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J.
1442, 1442 (1983) [hereinafter Fiss, Bureaucratization]. See generally Normative
Controversies Underlying Contemporary Debates About Civil Justice Reform: A
Way of Talking About Bureaucracy and the Future of the Federal Courts, 76
DENV. U. L. REv. 217, 220-21 (1998) (summarizing legal scholarship on the
bureaucratization of the judiciary).
88 See Fiss, Bureaucratization, supra note 87, at 1443.
89 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY 47-50 (2003) [hereinafter "21sT
CENTURY JUDICIARY REPORT"], available at
http://www.abanet.org/barserv/library/n/judiciaryand_the-courts/4543.pdf.
90 Id. (citing Hope Viner Sambom, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., October
2002, at 24). See also Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial
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* "The time, expense, and unpredictability of trials have
made negotiated or judge-brokered settlements and
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms increasingly
attractive, . . . [resulting in] a 'brain drain' for jurists who
leave the bench to become mediators or arbitrators."91
* As a corollary to the above, the role of the judge has
changed "from someone who dispassionately tries cases to
someone who rolls up her sleeves and helps the parties to
resolve their dispute by means short of trial." 92
* Finally, there has been a move toward "problem-solving
courts" to cope with various intractable societal problems,
such as drug addiction and substance abuse, mental
illness, domestic violence, prostitution, and shoplifting.9 3
Typical characteristics of such "problem-solving"
approaches are increased judicial monitoring of offenders
whose sentences have not involved incarceration, more
aggressive use of off-site scientists and social-service
providers, and community outreach.94
To begin with, many of these assertions are made largely on the
basis of anecdotal evidence, which makes evaluation of their validity
difficult. The substance of these assertions is important, however, so
solid empirical research would be valuable and is badly needed. Even
assuming the accuracy of these assertions, however, does not lead
ineluctably to the far-reaching conclusion that the role of trial
Courts?, 55 SMU L. REv. 1405, 1405-07 (2002) (expressing "concerns over trial
numbers" and noting a "decline in trials" and an "attending decline in participation
of lay citizens . . . in our justice system"); Leonard Post, Federal Tort Trials
Continue a Downward Spiral, 27 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 22, 2005, at P7 (quoting
Professor Stephen Burbank as observing that "federal judges now give more
attention to case management and non-trial adjudication than they give to trials,"
and "it is quite clear that 'trial' judges ought to spend more time on that activity
from which the name is taken").
91 21sT CENTURY JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 89, at 47.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 48.
94 Id.
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judges95 has fundamentally changed. Although research to support
this point would be helpful, intuitively it seems unlikely-even if, as
a result of concerns over overburdened dockets in the 1970s and
1980s, U.S. district judges try fewer civil cases than they did thirty or
forty years ago 96-that trial judges today try fewer cases than their
forebears of a century ago. Any number of factors may have
contributed to a change in profile of federal court dockets and led to
trial of fewer civil cases as a result of combining the mandate of the
Speedy Trial Act 9 7 with the proliferation of criminal matters, and the
average number of cases tried per judge may be lower solely as a
percentage of the overall docket.
These phenomena, it should be noted, have been documented
primarily with regard to the federal system,98 and not without harsh
95 It bears mention that no claim has been advanced that the role of appellate
judges has changed. Unless IJE were to be confined to those aspiring only to the
trial bench, the curriculum would have to accommodate all levels of the judiciary.
96 See AMERICAN COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, THE "VANISHING TRIAL": THE
COLLEGE, THE PROFESSION, THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at 4-5 (2004) (observing
that "[t]he number of civil trials in federal court over the 40 years from 1962-2002
has fallen, both as a percentage of filings and in absolute numbers. . . . These
numbers are particularly startling in light of the enormous increase in litigation
over the same 40 year period"). See also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of
Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2005). But cf Stephen B.
Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference
in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal
Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571, 571-87 (2004) (cautioning against
exaggerating our ability reliably to draw causal inferences from currently available
data); John Lande, "The Vanishing Trial" Report: An Alternative View of the Data,
DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2004, at 19, 19-21 (disputing the accuracy of the
common perception that decrease in trial rates is attributable to an increase in ADR
and arguing that more research is necessary to determine if there is a causal
connection).
9 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2008).
98 Movement toward a culture of devoting increased federal judicial resources
to promoting settlements and alternative dispute resolution originated with former
Chief Justice Warren Burger. See, e.g., Chief Justice Highlights Needs and
Achievements in Year-End Report, THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1984, at 1, 10 (referring to
an earlier report of the Federal Judicial Center calling for increased use of
arbitration); Martin J. Newhouse, Some Reflections on ADR and the Changing Role
of the Courts, BOSTON BAR J., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 15, 17 (noting that "former Chief
Justice Burger has consistently been a vocal advocate of ADR"). Promotional
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criticism from academia (particularly from Professor Owen Fiss),99
but considerably more research and data are needed with respect to
the myriad of functions performed by state trial courts.10 Indeed,
there has been some, but very little, evidence of diminution in the
work of state trial courts,' 0' and the trial of contested cases remains
the key function of judges today as in yesteryear.
The "brain drain" phenomenon identified by the 21st Century
Report'0 2 does not denote any fundamental alteration in the trial
efforts in this direction increased during the tenure of Judge William Schwarzer as
Director of the Federal Judicial Center. See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Managing
Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978). See also D.
MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 93
(Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed., 1986) (criticizing academics and praising "[s]ettlement-
oriented judges" who have a "fundamental commitment to enhancing settlement
opportunities in federal courts").
99 E.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984)
(asserting movement away from litigation-centered legal education to alternative
dispute resolution "rest[s] on questionable premises"). See Fiss, Bureaucratization,
supra note 87, at 1443 (contending "bureaucratization" of the judiciary "tends to
corrode the individualistic processes that are the source of judicial legitimacy").
See also David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of
Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 150-52
(1981) (arguing that to the extent "that the trend toward administration alters the
traditional mode of adjudication, it may threaten the effectiveness of the courts").
00 There have been some studies, now largely dated, of declining trial rates in
certain counties (predominantly rural) in Illinois, see Stephen Daniels, Continuity
and Change in Patterns of Case Handling: A Case Study of Two Rural Counties,
19 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 381 (1985), Missouri, see generally WAYNE MCINTOSH,
THE APPEAL OF CIVIL LAW (1990), and California, see Lawrence M. Friedman &
Robert V. Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito
Counties, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 267 (1975). These studies are, as Sherlock
Holmes would say, "suggestive," but considerably more detailed and up-to-date
research is needed.
"oI The dubiety of any significant diminution in tried cases is underscored by
statistical evidence reported by the National Center for the State Courts (NCSC),
showing an increase in civil and criminal filings between 1977 and 1981 of 23
percent and 29 percent, respectively, and a similar increase between 1984 and 2000
of 30 percent and 46 percent, respectively, together with an increase during the
latter period of 66 percent in juvenile filings and 79 percent in domestic relations
filings. See 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 89, at 39-40 (citing
NCSC statistics).
102 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 89, at 36. See also infra note
105.
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judge's role and is not, 10 3 in fact, limited to trial judges but
encompasses appellate judges as well. It is more likely simply a
consequence of the disparity in pay between the judiciary and the
practicing bar,' 04 and of other repercussions of inadequate legislative
funding of the judiciary (both federal'os and state 0 6).
On the other hand, the "rolling up one's sleeves" and "problem-
solving courts" phenomena-certainly probative (if any proof were
needed!) of the lengths to which overworked, underpaid judges will
go to manage their crowded (if not gridlocked) dockets and
minimize, to the extent they are able, the number of cases that will
take up scarce in-court adjudication time--does suggest some
changes in trial court function. Whether these rise to the level of
fundamental change must await further research.
Thus, unlike the experience of foreign judicial education
programs, it is possible that recent alterations in the role of trial
judges support the notion of IJE. As yet, however, there is no
103 See id. at 47 (discussing the changes in the trial judge's role).
'" In 2008, the annual salary for a first-year associate at a top-tier Boston firm
was an astounding $165,000. See generally, NALP Directory of Legal Employers,
http://www.nalpdirectory.com/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
"o' The 21st Century Judiciary Report recognizes this. 21ST CENTURY
JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 89, at 35-36, 47. On the disparity in pay, both Chief
Justice Roberts and his predecessor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, have been sounding
the tocsin for twenty years now, but no one in Congress has paid heed. See, e.g.,
John G. Roberts, Jr., 2006 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 3 (Jan. 1,
2007), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/yearend/2006year-
endreport.pdf. Relative remuneration of federal judges has continued to deteriorate.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has estimated that the real pay of
federal judges has declined since 1969 by almost 24 percent, while the real pay of
the average American worker during that time has increased by almost 18 percent.
Id. at 3. Thirty-eight federal judges left the federal bench (left, not retired) in the
past six years alone, 17 of them in the past two years. Id. at 6. The Chief Justice's
Annual Reports continue to sound the alarm, though seemingly to little avail. See
John G. Roberts, Jr., 2008 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary 8 (Jan. 1,
2009) (decrying congressional failure to enact federal judicial pay raises or even a
cost-of-living increase such as is given to every federal employee, including
members of Congress themselves), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2008year-endreport.pdf.
'
06 See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE COST OF JUSTICE: BUDGETARY
THREATS TO AMERICA'S COURTS (2006), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/The Cost-ofJusticeBudgetary
ThreatstoAmerica'sCourts.pdf.
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plerophory. To make a truly convincing case requires recognition of
something even closer to home, something that is at once apodictic
and vital to the very legitimacy of the judiciary. That something is
the people's perception of the fairness and impartiality of the courts.
C. Declining Public Confidence in the Judiciary
A variety of articles'0 7 and surveys 1 s have from time to time
revealed significant variations in these public perceptions among
racial and ethnic groups. A 1992 survey of California residents and
attorneys yielded an aggregate negative rating of the California court
system among 52 percent of those surveyed;' 09 further disaggregating
those data, the percentage of African-Americans rating the court
system as "poor" amounted to 47 percent (as compared with a 17
percent "poor" rating among all those surveyed)."10 A 1999 NCSC-
sponsored survey showed the following breakdown among those
responding "strongly agree" to the proposition that "[j]udges are
generally honest and fair in deciding cases": 34 percent among non-
Hispanic whites, 29 percent among Hispanics, and 18 percent among
107 See, e.g., R. William Ide, III, Eradicating Bias in the Justice System, A.B.A.
J., Mar. 1994, at 8 (noting minorities' lack of faith in the judiciary); H.T. Smith,
Toward A More Diverse Judiciary, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 8 (urging increased
attention to diversity on the bench); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial
Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV.
95, 119-28 (1997) (arguing that the impartial judge mandate of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires racial diversity on the bench); Edward M. Chen, The
Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1109, 1117 (2003)
(questioning how the public can repose confidence and trust in the judiciary if the
communities it is supposed to protect are excluded from its ranks).
1os See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
109 Among those surveyed, 35 percent rated the courts only "fair," and 17
percent rated them "poor." See David B. Rottman, What Cahfornians Think About
Their Courts: Highlights from a New Survey of the Public and Attorneys, CAL.
COURTS REV., Fall 2005, 6, 6.
In fairness, it should be noted that a more recent survey in California shows
marked improvement in public perception of the courts there. As compared with 52
percent negative opinions overall in 1992, 67 percent of those surveyed in 2005
gave a positive response ("excellent," "very good," or "good"), and the percentage
of African-Americans expressing the most negative evaluation ("poor") declined
from 47 percent in 1992 to 18 percent in 2005. Id. at 7.
110 Id.
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African-Americans;"' indeed, nearly 70 percent of African-
Americans believed that courts treated black people worse than
whites and Hispanics, a proposition with which 40 percent of whites
and Hispanics agreed.1 12 That same year, a joint A.B.A. Journal-
National Bar Association Magazine survey of lawyers reported that
more than half of African-American attorneys strongly believed that
racial prejudice exists in the courts and more than half of white
attorneys believed that "some" racial prejudice exists there." 3
Finally, a 2001 survey conducted by the Justice at Stake Campaign
yielded similar results: 85 percent of African-Americans believed
that there is different justice for the rich than for the poor, 55 percent
of them believed that judges are not fair and impartial (as compared
with 62 percent of whites surveyed who believed that judges are fair
and impartial), and only 43 percent of African-Americans surveyed
(as compared with 67 percent of whites) believed that judges are
committed to the public interest.1 14
The Supreme Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that
the judiciary's legitimacy and efficacy derives largely from the
public's confidence in its fairness and fidelity to the law.' 15 In recent
years, large campaign expenditures have become a virtual
prerequisite for election to state judicial office. To meet this demand,
judicial candidates increasingly depend on large contributors."16
"' See generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STATE COURTS, HOW THE
PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999).
112 Id.
" See Terry Carter, Divided Justice, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 43.
114 Justice at Stake Campaign, National Survey of American Voters (2002),
available at http://faircourts.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf.
"s See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 752 (1999) (a state court's
"legitimacy derives from fidelity to law"); United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361,
407 (1989) ("The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its
reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship."); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Am. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982)
("public confidence [is] essential" to the judicial branch) (quoting United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). See also Caperton
v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. at 2266-67 (quoting Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
116 This phenomenon is not limited to state high court elections. Candidate
fundraising is also on the rise in elections for trial and intermediate appellate
judgeships. For example, two candidates running for an Illinois intermediate
appellate court judgeship in 2006 quadrupled the previous state record by raising a
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These elections are no longer "low key affairs, conducted with
civility and dignity,"" 7 but involve highly reported, politicized
campaigns marked by million-dollar budgets and heated competition.
This massive influx of money may pose a threat of judicial
impropriety, both actual and apparent.
A substantial majority of the public-often 80 percent or
higher-believes that campaign contributions influence judicial
decisions, according to a variety of surveys conducted at both the
national" 8 and the state" 9 level. Tellingly, many state court judges
combined $3.3 million. See LAUREN JONES, JAMES SAMPLE & RACHEL WEISS, THE
NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 24 (Justice at Stake Campaign ed., 2006),
available at http://www.gavelgrab.org/wp-
content/resources/NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006.pdf. Fundraising records
will continue to be broken as more interest groups do the same mental calculus
candidly acknowledged by an Ohio AFL-CIO official: "[W]e figured out a long
time ago that it's easier to elect seven judges than to elect 132 legislators." J.
Christopher Heagarty, The Changing Face of Judicial Elections, N.C. ST. B. J. 19,
20 (2002).
' Richard Briffault, Public Funds and the Regulation ofJudicial Campaigns,
35 IND. L. REv. 819, 819 (2002) (quoting Peter D. Webster, Selection and
Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 19
(1995)).
118 Michael Hennessy & Bruce Hardy, The Annenberg Public Policy Center of
the University of Pennsylvania, Public Understanding of and Support for the
Court: Judicial Survey Results (2007), available at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/20071017_JudicialSurvey
/Judicial
Findings_ 10-17-2007.pdf (finding that 69 percent of the public "thinks that
raising money for elections affects a judge's rulings to a moderate or great
extent."); Christian W. Peck, Zogby International (commissioned by The
Committee for Economic Development), Attitudes and Views ofAmerican Business
Leaders on State Judicial Elections and Political Contributions to Judges (2007),
available at http://www.ced.org/images/contentlevents/judicial/zogby07.pdf
(finding that 79 percent of business executives believe "campaign contributions
have an impact on judges' decisions, and more than 80 percent of African-
Americans express this view, including 51 percent believing that judicial election
contributions carry a "great deal" of influence).
'9 Texas: Sup. Ct. of Tex., State Bar of Tex. & Tex. Office of Ct. Admin., The
Courts and the Legal Profession in Texas: The Insider's Perspective: A Survey of
Judges, Court Personnel, and Attorneys (1999) (finding that 83 percent of Texans
believe money has an impact on judicial decisions); Texans for Public Justice, Pay
to Play: How Big Money Buys Access to the Texas Supreme Court (2001),
available at http://www.tpj.org/docs/2001/04/reports/paytoplay/index.htm (finding
Texas Supreme Court 750 percent more likely to grant discretionary petitions for
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feel the same way: A 2002 national survey of elected state judges
showed that 22 percent of them believe campaign contributions have
at least some influence on judge's decisions, and another 4 percent
believe such contributions have a great deal of influence.' 20
review filed by contributors of at least $100,000 than by non-contributors, and
1,000 percent more likely to grant them for contributors of $250,000 or more).
Pennsylvania: Lake Sosin Snell Perry & Associates (commissioned by The
Pennsylvania Special Commission to Limit Campaign Expenditures), Banners from
a Survey of 500 Registered Voters in the State of Pennsylvania (1998) (finding that
voters "overwhelmingly agree that the amount of money in elections and
campaigns has caused them to lose a great deal of faith in the political system"),
available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/NR/rdonlyres/46DA48FO-A7Bl-436C-
BF9C-66DF7BF6E3CF/0/sclce.pdf. See also Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice for
Sale, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2007, at A25 (noting that nine out of ten
Pennsylvanians regard judicial fund raising as evidence that justice is for sale).
Ohio: T.C. Brown, Majority of Court Rulings Favor Campaign Donors, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 15, 2000, at 1A (reporting 1995 Ohio survey where 90 percent
of respondents believed campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions). See
also Adam Liptak and Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's
Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at Al (finding that Ohio's Supreme Court
justices "routinely sat on cases after receiving campaign contributions from the
parties involved or from groups that filed supporting briefs," and "voted in favor of
contributors 70 percent of the time."
Louisiana: Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Louisiana Supreme Court in
Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on
the Judicial Function, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1291 (2008) (showing striking statistical
bias toward contributors by state supreme court justices over fourteen-year period).
Note, however, that the methodology of this study has subsequently been called
into question. See Robert Newman, Janet Speyrer & Dek Terrell, A Critique of
"The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of
the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function" (2008), available at
http://www.lasc.org/press room/pressreleases/2008/
Critique_of TulaneLawReview.pdf; E. Phelps Gay & Kevin R. Tully,
Rebuttal of The Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and
Statistical Study of the Effects of Campaign Money on the Judicial Function
(2008), available at http://www.lasc.org/press room/press releases/2008/
Rebuttal Revised.pdf. This contretemps was evidently of sufficient magnitude
as to engender a letter of apology from the Dean of the Tulane Law School to the
Justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court. See Letter from Lawrence Ponoroff to
Hon. Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. et al. (Sept. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.lasc.org/press room/pressreleases/2008/AR-
TUAPOLOGYLETTER.pdf.
120 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc. (commissioned by the Justice at
Stake Campaign), Justice at Stake-State Judges Frequency Questionnaire (2001-
2002) 5, available at www.gqrr.com/articles/1617/141 1_JASjudges.pdf.
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One can distill, from several elements identified by researchers to
be of key importance to such popular perceptions, some basic themes
vital to the ongoing legitimacy of the judiciary. First, judges must
treat those who come before them with dignity and respect. 12 1
Second, there must always be full and fair opportunities for litigants
to present their cases. Third, we must have neutral decision-making
by fair, honest, and impartial judges,' 22 who have the sense to recuse
themselves in situations, such as cases involving litigants who are
substantial campaign contributors, where the appearance of
impartiality has been tarnished.123 Fourth, minority perceptions
would be enhanced not only by demonstrable impartiality of
individual jurists but also a kind of structural impartiality achieved by
a greater percentage of minority facesl24 in judicial robes. In short,
the public demands fairness and impartiality, both actual and
121 State bar associations and judicial conduct commissions often collect
detailed information about bad judicial behavior, though most of the time this
information is never made public. There have been, however, some notable
exceptions. See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, Pataki Choice for Judgeship is
Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2003, at BI (regarding nomination of state court
judge Dora Irizzary to the federal district bench, bar association comments included
"[s]tatements that Judge Irizzary was gratuitously rude and abrasive and demeaned
lawyers, that she flew off the handle in a rage for no apparent reason and screamed
at attorneys, that she was impatient and did not fully listen to attorneys' legal
arguments, and did not have a good grasp of the legal issues presented to her.");
Recommendations for Judicial Retention, Colorado State Bar, 2000 Evaluation of
Judge Adele K. Anderson, available at
http://www.cobar.org/static/judges/nov2000/l0CNTYaanderson.htm (evaluating a
judge as "discourteous and condescending to those appearing in her courtroom as
well as to staff members" and engaging in "demeaning and harsh treatment of
individuals appearing in her court without legal counsel.").
122 See David B. Rottman, What Calfornians Think About Their Courts:
Highlights from a New Survey of the Public andAttorneys, CAL. COURTs REv., Fall
2005, at 7-8.
123 Cf Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
124 Justices O'Connor and White, in their tributes to Justice Marshall,
recounted how his different perspective enriched the deliberation process. See
generally Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a
Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1217 (1992); Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice
Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1215 (1992). See also Chen, supra note 107,
at 1111-13 (providing statistics on the percentage of minorities among the federal
judiciary (including bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges) and the California
judiciary).
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perceived, and both substantive and procedural. As Justice
Frankfurter cogently observed in another context, "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice."l 25
Survey results show that the public, and particularly certain
identifiable segments thereof, perceive the judiciary as failing to live
up to these reasonable expectations.126 Given these perceptions-and
these disparities-there is certainly a case to be made for educating
judges to conduct the business of the courts in a manner that not only
lives up in fact to the ideals that lend legitimacy to the judiciary and
judicial decisions, but also dispels any significant public perceptions
(or misperceptions, as the case may be) of biased or unequal justice.
IV. TOWARDS AN IJE CURRICULUM
In crafting a potential curriculum for IJE, one is faced with two
preliminary issues. First, the program cannot realistically
differentiate between courses appropriate for the trial bench versus
those for the appellate bench. Obviously, no one who has availed
himself of IJE can possibly know whether he will ever ascend to the
bench, and for those who are ultimately selected based on an
appointive (as opposed to electoral) process, whether the
appointment will be at the trial or appellate level. Second, the
curriculum should not duplicate the kinds of courses that are
currently offered-and that it makes sense to offer-to individuals
who have already been selected for judicial office.
In his article, Judge Amy suggests an LL.M. degree program as
the model for IJE. He justifiably extols the intellectual advantages of
an academic setting and argues that completion of the requirements
for an academic degree signal expertise in the subject matter of the
curriculum.' 27 No doubt his enthusiasm for this model springs from
his enormously positive experience at the University of Virginia's
Master of Laws in the Judicial Process program. Such a formal-
indeed, luxurious-academic blueprint does not, however, seem
necessary for the more modest goals of a voluntary IJE program
aimed at practicing lawyers who aspire to, but may never achieve,
125 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
126 See supra note 119.
127 Amy, supra note 38, at 138-39.
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judicial office. This can readily be seen from the design of the U.Va.
LL.M. program itself, which was directed at those who are already
sitting judges128 and even more particularly at appellate judges, and
which had, according to Judge Amy, "a three-year format, with two
resident summer sessions and a thesis requirement." 29 Such a
commitment of time and labor, and the concomitant exposure to a
variety of legal subjects, is entirely appropriate to justify the award of
an advanced legal degree but unrealistic for an IJE program.
Furthermore, Judge Amy's point about expertise, while eminently
sensible in the abstract, seems to overshoot the mark when it comes
to the considerably more humble goals of IJE.'30 Preliminarily, it
should be noted that even the excellent U.Va. LL.M. Program did not
guarantee any particular expertise, because the curriculum varied
from year to year. For example, courses offered in the summer of
2000 included "Courts and Social Science," "Environmental Risks
and Scientific Evidence," "European Union Law," "International Law
in American Courts," "American Constitutional History: From Brown
to the Present," and "Modem Civil Legal Systems;" offered in the
summer of 1999 were "American Constitutional History: 1781 to
1861," "American Constitutional History: Reconstruction to Brown, "
"Contemporary Legal Thought," "Law and Economics," and
"Legislation."l 31 If the case for IJE is largely, if not wholly,
128 This is also true for the Dwight D. Opperman Institute of Judicial
Administration at the New York University School of Law, which trains not only
sitting U.S. judges but also foreign judges, and sponsors appellate judges'
seminars, workshops on special topics in the law, the Brennan lecture series
honoring the state judiciary, and a biennial research conference. See NYU School
of Law - Institute of Judicial Administration: Programs,
http://www.law.nyu.edu/centers/judicial/programs/index.htm (last visited Nov. 16,
2009). Likewise, the National Judicial College at the University of Nevada-Reno is
oriented toward the training of sitting judges, both from the United States and
abroad. See The National Judicial College - The NJC Experience, available at
http://www.judges.org/about.html.
129 Amy, supra note 38, at 131.
130 Id. at 137.
131 See Judges Program, Curriculum and Faculty,
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/
prospectives/judges/judges-curriculum.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). The
appellate orientation is self-evident. This website has since been dismantled,
because the reputedly excellent LL.M. program in Judicial Process sadly has been
discontinued as a result of the drying up of sources of funding. Telephone
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predicated on sensitizing judicial aspirants to the importance of core
values of the judiciary, then no particular substantive expertise, no
courses in European Union law, U.S. constitutional history, and civil
law systems, and no lengthy residential academic program, with or
without thesis, are necessary.
Indeed, much of the formal learning about the craft of
adjudication-an essential component, to be sure, of being an
effective judge-is already imparted in the legal academy. While
there has long been some dissatisfaction, on the part of the organized
bar and others, with the apparent disjunction between what students
learn in law school and what they are capable (or, more to the point,
incapable) of doing when they enter law practice,132 almost nobody
would deny that if students learn anything during their three years of
law school, it is how to read judicial opinions, analyze them, critique
them, synthesize them, and deconstruct them. In short, recent
American law graduates are far more able to perform certain
substantive judicial functions than they are to draft, interpret, or
negotiate contracts and other legal documents.
The aforementioned canvassing of the literature,133 while not
unearthing more than a couple of articles pertinent to IJE, did find
numerous instances of off-the-cuff suggestions (mostly unelaborated)
for existing judges receiving additional education across a broad
spectrum of topics: more education in health law issues,134 more
conversation between the author and Ms. Joyce Holt at the University of Virginia
School of Law LL.M. Program (May 21, 2008).
132 See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW
SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992); Harry T. Edwards,
The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a
Machine: The Dissonance between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1231 (1991).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
134 See, e.g., Cynthia Honssinger, Robert lanni & Jeff Millsteen, The Emerging
Role of State Attorneys General in Public Health Emergencies, 33 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 115, 117 (2005); Gene W. Matthews, Georges Benjamin, S. Peter Mills,
Wendy Parmet & James J. Misrahi, Legal Preparedness for Bioterrorism, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 52, 55 (2002).
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education in environmental law and land use, 135 more education in
end-of-life decision-making (recall the Terry Schiavo imbrogliol 36),
more education in business, 137 more education about aberrant
behavior, mental illness, substance abuse, and anger management,138
more education in genetics,139 more education in science generally,14 0
135 See, e.g., Sarah M.R. Cravens, In Pursuit ofActual Justice, 59 ALA. L. REV.
1, 22 (2007) (describing efforts of the Foundation for Research on Enviro-
Economic Development).
136 See, e.g., Mark C. Miller, When Congress Attacks the Federal Courts, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (2006).
137 See, e.g., Stan Bernstein, Susan H. Seabury & Jack F. Williams, The
Empowerment of Bankruptcy Courts in Addressing Financial Expert Testimony, 80
AM. BANKR. L.J. 377, 394 (2006); Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes:
Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small
Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 881, 912 (1995). Cf John D. Echeverria, Changing
the Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in State Judicial
Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 232-33 (2001) (noting judicial education
program for state court judges at the University of Kansas, funded by the Fred C.
and Mary R. Koch Foundations, emphasizing a law and economics approach to
legal analysis). To address this problem, the ABA has recommended, after a study
on the subject by an ad hoc committee, that specialized business courts should be
created in every state. See Report of the ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Business
Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient Judiciary, 52 Bus. LAW. 947
(1997). Only a few states (not counting Delaware, of course, whose courts have an
in-depth and highly sophisticated business law jurisprudence) have followed
through on this suggestion, some on a statewide basis (these states include North
Carolina, California, and Maryland) and some on only a limited basis (a special
commercial calendar in the Cook County Court in Illinois, a Special Business
Court in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia
County, Pennsylvania), and the Business Litigation Section of the Superior Court
in Suffolk, Essex, Middlesex, and Norfolk counties in Massachusetts (i.e., in and
around Boston).
138 See, e.g., Arline S. Rotman, Commentary on "Empirical and Ethical
Problems with Custody Recommendations:" A Call for New Family Court
Priorities, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 242, 245 (2005).
139 See, e.g., Joanne Seltzer, Note, The Cassandra Complex: An Employer's
Dilemma in the Genetic Workplace, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 411, 470 (1998).
140 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Schmidt, A Dark and Stormy Night: The Mystery of
the Missing Science in Fingerprint Identification, 75 DEF. COUNs. J. 47, 76 (2008);
Michelle Mello & Kathryn Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of
the Field, 96 GEO. L.J. 649, 700 n.251 (2008) (citing RESCUING SCIENCE FROM
POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (Wendy
Wagner & Rena Steinzor, eds. 2006) (describing program at Brooklyn Law School
to educate judges on empirical methodology)).
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more education in statistics,141 more education in intellectual
property,142 more education about technology,143 more education in
ADR,'" more education about pro bono initiatives, 145  more
education in art and aesthetics, 14 6 more education in negotiation and
settlement,14 7 more education about child abuse, 148 more education
about gender bias,149 more education about addiction,'5 0 more
141 See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Teaching Statistics to Judges, 42 JURIMETRICS J.
351 (2002).
142 See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving
Scary Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1421 & n.22 (2003) (citing A.
HOWARD MATZ, WHO CAN UNDERSTAND THIS STUFF? How AMERICAN COURTS
ATTEMPT TO EDUCATE JUDGES AND JURIES ABOUT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 14
(2001) (prepared for the International Conference on the Rights of Intellectual
Property in Cyberspace).
"' See, e.g., Thomas J. Moyer & Stephen P. Anway, Biotechnology and the
Bar: A Response to the Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal
Environment, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 671, 719-25 (2007); Erich Taylor, A New
Wave of Police Interrogation? "Brain Fingerprinting," The Constitutional
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL'Y 287, 303 n.149 (citing Caryn Tamber, Brave Neuro World, THE
DAILY RECORD (Baltimore), Dec. 20, 2005).
'" See, e.g., Sam Ledbetter & Chris Thomason, Circuit Court Appointment
Commission, 40 ARK. LAW. 16, 21 (Winter 2005); Brian L. Josias, Burying the
Hatchet in Burial Disputes: Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution to Disputes
Concerning the Interment ofBodies, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141, 1180 (2004).
145 See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1, 51 n.299 (2004).
146 See, e.g., Louise Harmon, Law, Art, and the Killing Jar, 79 IOWA L. REV.
367, 409 (1994).
147 See e.g., Morton Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial Settlement
Databases: Development and Uses, 43 No.1 JUDGES' J. 19 (Winter 2004).
148 See, e.g., Myrna S. Rader, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a
"Testimonial" World. The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and
Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009 (2007).
149 See, e.g., Angie Perone, Note, Unchain My Heart: Slavery as a Defense to
the Dismantling of the Violence Against Women Act, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
115, 116 (2006); Kimberly A. Lonsway, Leslie V. Freeman, Lilia M. Cortina,
Vicki J. Magley & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Understanding the Judicial Role in
Addressing Gender Bias: A View from the Eighth Circuit Federal Court System, 27
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 205, 228 (2002); Hope Viner Samborn, Gender Bias in the
Courts: Working Toward Change, A.B.A. PERSP., Winter/Spring 2002, at 4, 6,
available at http://www.abanet.org/women/PSPGenderBias2.pdf.
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education in capital cases,' 5 ' more education in international law,152
etc. While these suggestions were directed toward post-judicial
education, they provide a glimpse of the multifarious agendas for
judicial reform that exist and, at the same time, make us take a step
back and realize that judges cannot be all things to all people.
Perhaps, in the sixteenth century, it might have been possible for an
intellectually gifted individual (e.g., Sir Francis Bacon) to have
acquired virtually encyclopedic knowledge of all published areas of
human inquiry. By now those days are long gone, if in fact they ever
existed.'53 There are simply too many books, too many fields of
inquiry, and too much information for any single human being to
assimilate.' 54
Iso See, e.g., Lauren Shapiro, An HIV Advocate's View of Family Court:
Lessons from a Broken System, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 133, 144 (1998);
Barrie L. Becker, Note, Order in the Court: Challenging Judges Who Incarcerate
Pregnant, Substance-Dependent Defendants to Protect Fetal Health, 19 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 235, 257 & n.175 (1991).
151 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death
Penalty Before and After McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 34, 52 (2007).
152 See, e.g., Janet Kovin Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: The Glass Is Half
Full, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 29, 33-35 (2007); Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not
Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish US. Law, 39
ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 38 n.243 (2007).
151 Compare the following passage about the training of 19th Century Dutch
foreign service
officers:
A contrdleur was one of the more junior grades in the Dutch colonial
service, presiding over a subdivision of a residency known as an afdeling,
or department; but junior or no, a candidate had to spend four years at the
College of Delft and pass with honors a rigorous examination that
included the Javanese and Malay languages (both very similar, to be sure);
French, German, and English language and literature; Islamic law,
algebra, geometry, trigonometry, geology (no doubt helpful to the present
task), drawing, land surveying and leveling, as well as a host of other
disciplines including, for some less explicable reason, the subtle mysteries
of "Italian book keeping... ."
SIMON WINCHESTER, KRAKATOA - THE DAY THE WORLD EXPLODED: AUGUST
27, 1883 155 n* (2003).
154 We need not, however, be preoccupied with the spectre of judges lacking
sufficient education or technical training across the broad spectrum of subjects our
courts encounter. In appropriate circumstances, judges can always appoint special
masters who can bring to bear the requisite expertise far more efficiently.
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At the same time, we must recognize, as Cardozo did, the
evolutionary nature of the judicial process:
The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in
another sense ephemeral. What is good in it endures. What is
erroneous is pretty sure to perish. The good remains the
foundation on which new structures will be built. The bad
will be rejected and cast off in the laboratory of the years.
Little by little the old doctrine is undermined. Often the
encroachments are so gradual that their significance is at first
obscured. Finally we discover that the contour of the
landscape has been changed, that the old maps must be cast
aside, and the ground charted anew.1 55
A model IJE curriculum should focus on primary skills that will
be essential for aspirants to judicial office. Many of these skills will
prove useful to people, especially busy lawyers, in their daily lives,
even if they never realize (or decide to abandon) their judicial
ambitions. Indeed, some examples of appropriate areas for training
can be gleaned by negative inference from reports of disciplinary
proceedings against judges, while others may be identified merely by
common sense. Thus a curriculum could include short courses in:
* developing listening skills;
* interpreting body language;156
* judicial demeanor, and the proper treatment of
court staff,'5 7 attorneys,ss litigants,159 witnesses,160 and
others;'61
'. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 178 (1921).
..6 This would be particularly useful for trial judges, as an aid to assessing the
credibility of witnesses.
'5 Cf Fletcher v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958, 963-64
(Cal. 1998) (concluding that judge improperly used court staff, law clerk, and
public defender for reelection campaign purposes); id. at 964 (approving finding
that judge engaged in prejudicial misconduct by holding court clerk in contempt for
refusing to discuss employment matter without union representative present); In re
McClain, 662 N.E.2d 935, 937 (Ind. 1996) (finding that judge sent vulgar letters to
secretary employed at courthouse and enclosed a used condom); In re Deming, 736
P.2d 639, 654 (Wash. 1987) (noting allegations by court personnel of sexual
harassment by judge); Miss. High Court Orders Judge Reprimanded, BATON
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ROUGE ADVOC., Oct. 12, 2001, at 2B (reporting on judge accused of verbally
abusing court clerks and other county employees); Cheryl Reid, Tollefson, Stolz
Say They Offer Clear Choice, TACOMA NEWS TRIB., Oct. 12, 2000, at BI (reporting
on judge who chased court employees down hallway in a rage). Perhaps the most
highprofile example is that of former U.S. District Judge Samuel B. Kent, who
sexually assaulted both his case manager and his secretary and who, after lying
about those incidents to an investigative committee of judges, was prosecuted for
obstruction of justice and sentenced, after a guilty plea, to 33 months
imprisonment. James C. McKinley, Jr., Judge Sentenced to Prison for Lying About
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2009, at Al5. Judge Kent was subsequently
impeached by the House of Representatives, see Ashley Southall, House Approves
Impeachment Articles Against Judge, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2009, at A12, but he
resigned from the bench rather than face trial in the U.S. Senate, see Bloomberg
News, Texas: Impeached Federal Judge Will Step Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2009, at A12. For more details on the Kent scandal, see, e.g., John Council,
Congress Tries to Knock "King" Samuel B. Kent Off His Throne, TEX. LAW., June
8, 2009, at 6.
"' Cf Fletcher, 968 P.2d at 963 (finding that judge made inappropriate and
sexist remarks about counsel); In re Elliston, 789 S.W.2d 469, 480 (Mo. 1990)
(noting testimony of sixteen attorneys on their personal experiences with abusive
judge); Deming, 736 P.2d 639, 655-56 (Wash. 1987) (removing from office judge
who commented on the breasts of one female prosecutor and told another "I would
really like to jump your bones"); In re Raab (N.Y. Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, Feb.
3, 2003) (finding persistent pattern of abuse by judge of attorneys), available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/R/raab.htm; Ralph Ranalli, Lopez
Resigns, Denies Misdeeds; Says Accepting Findings Goes Against Principles,
BOSTON GLOBE, May 20, 2003, at Al (reporting on notorious case where judge
was persistently rude, discourteous, sarcastic, and condescending toward
prosecutors); Robert Becker, State Ousts Judge, Cites Harassment, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 4, 2001, at I (reporting removal from office of judge who sexually harassed
four female prosecutors).
15 Abuse of defendants unfortunately has a long pedigree in this country, as
evidenced by the prejudicial and intemperate (indeed, contemptuous) treatment by
Justice William Paterson of Congressman Matthew Lyon, lawyer Thomas Cooper,
journalist Joseph Callender, and others in presiding over prosecutions under the
Sedition Act of 1798. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
48-64 (2004). Cf Fletcher, 968 P.2d at 963 (judge improperly entered judgment
against nonparty, without affording notice or an opportunity to be heard, because
judge subjectively thought he "ought to pay"); id. at 971-74, 975-76 (detailing
numerous ex parte contacts with criminal defendants); Miller, supra note 18, at 444
n.118 (citing Robynn Tysver, Omaha Judge Reprimanded for Mistreating
Defendants, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 30, 2000, at 13 (reporting that judge
routinely yelled at and berated defendants appearing before him)).
16 Cf id. at 444 n. 119 (citing In re Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603, 603 (Wis.
1989) (disciplining a judge for criticizing "victim-witness . . . for crying during
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* jury selection and selection of a foreperson;16 2
* efficient, but appropriate,163 use of law clerks and
staff attorneys;' 
* sensitivity training to help identify and cope with
stereotyping and latent bias and prejudice, e.g., those
based (albeit with some overlap in many instances) on
race, 165 ethnicity,166 religion,167 gender,16 8 nationality,' 69
cross-examination")); Fletcher, 968 P.2d at 974-75 (detailing judge's numerous ex
parte contacts with witnesses).
61 Cf Deming,736 P.2d at 653-654 (noting factual findings with respect to
judge's affair with probation department employee, attempt to use his office to
secure a promotion for that employee, and sexual advances he made to an intern);
Miller, supra note 18, at 444 n.120 & 122 (citing Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d at 604
(noting that judge criticized state mental health hospital and its staff and stated that
"he had never found a doctor or any staff person associated with it to be
qualified"); In re Schwartz, 755 So.2d 110, 111 (Fla. 2000) (publicly reprimanding
judge who made sarcastic remarks about law professor and denigrated textbook the
professor had written)).
162 Cf Johnson v. Maryland, 915 F.2d 892, 894 (4th Cir. 1990) (showing a
judge, in racially charged murder trial, who failed to disclose to counsel in camera
conversation with juror who complained that the white foreperson was saying
"[t]he blacks [on the jury] are sticking together," and other remarks suggesting
racial prejudice). The author was counsel to the petitioner in this case.
1" Cf Miss. Judicial Performance Comm'n v. Hopkins, 590 So. 2d 857, 858
(Miss. 1991) (noting that a judge allowed court clerks to dismiss parking tickets);
In re Going (N.Y. Comm'n on Jud. Conduct, Dec. 29, 2000) (noting judge's
abusive behavior toward law clerk after termination of romantic relationship
between them), available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/going(2).htm; In re Ward, No. 79
CC-1 (Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., July 10, 1980) (describing allegation that judge
permitted a court clerk to conduct court calls and enter orders), complaint summary
available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm; Ann W. O'Neill, Appeals
Court Criticizes L.A. Judge for 'Egregious' Misconduct, L.A. TIMES, May 25,
2000, at B3 (reporting public criticism of trial judge for allowing law clerk to
preside over pretrial conference).
'" Cf Miller, supra note 158, at 441 n.85 (citing In re Hunter, 823 So. 2d 325,
336 (La. 2002) (stating that a judge failed to fulfill her duty to supervise her staff);
In re Van Susteren, 348 N.W.2d 579, 579 (Wis. 1984) (taking into account judge's
failure to supervise court personnel for prompt and efficient disposition of official
business as a factor in a suspension recommendation)).
1" Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.145 (citing, inter alia, In re Goodfarb,
880 P.2d 620, 621 (Ariz. 1994) (finding that judge in chambers used the phrase
"fucking niggers"); In re Flier (Cal. Comm'n on Jud. Performance, May 30, 1995)
(finding racial insensitivity in judge's reference to in-custody adult African
31-1
Education for Judicial Aspirants
American as a "good boy"), available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTFIFlierPA 05-30-95.rtf; Maurice Possley & Ken
Armstrong, Clamor Grows Over Associate Judge, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 1999, § 2,
at 1 (reporting that judicial candidate failed to disclose that he had committed racial
discrimination in jury selection in a murder case when serving as a public
prosecutor); John Caher, Commuter Tax Fight Next on Court Agenda: Internet
Porn, Russian Bank Cases Also to Be Heard, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 4, 2000, at 1
(reporting judge's obscene and racially offensive remarks, including reference to a
67-year-old murder victim as "just some old nigger bitch"); Mickey Ciokajlo,
Judge Accused of Misconduct; State Agency Cites Behavior, Remarks in Court,
CHI. TRIB., May 16, 2002, at 1 (reporting that judge referred to African American
as "boy")).
166 Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.146 (citing Karen Dorn Steele, Passing
Notes: Judge, Clerk Make Ethnic Slurs; Investigation Prompts Reprimand, IRE J.,
Mar. 1, 2002, at 32 (reporting judge's reference to Hispanic Americans as
"greasers")).
167 Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.147 (citing Fredric U. Dicker, Panel
Slams Judge's "Bizarre" Religious Remarks, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2003, at 2
(reporting judge's slurs directed at Jewish lawyer and Catholic schools)).
168 Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.143-44, 447 n.165 (citing, inter alia, In
re Cieslik, No. 87 CC-2 (Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., July 30, 1987) (reprimanding judge
for making "intemperate, rude and sexist remarks to women attorneys during
official proceedings"), complaint summary available at
http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm; Douglas Feiden, Trial and Error in
Queens Courts, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 7, 2003, at 4 (reporting that judge
dispensed toothbrushes to "deadbeat dads" before packing them off to jail);
Michele McPhee, Cases vs. Diamond Dismissed, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 3, 2003,
at 35 (reporting complaints of misconduct filed against judge allegedly so hostile to
men in divorce cases that husbands who had appeared before her formed support
group); Joe Fitzgerald, Apology Now Would be Too Little, Too Late, BOSTON
HERALD, Apr. 30, 2003, at 5 (reporting bias in favor of transgendered individuals
by judge who described kidnapping and attempted rape of 11-year-old boy by
transgendered person as "a low-level offense")).
" Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 446 nn.150-51 & 153 (citing In re Haugner
(Cal. Comm'n on Jud. Performance, Apr. 11, 1994) (finding that a judge made
comments that were insensitive to persons of Japanese ancestry and reflected
possible racial or ethnic bias), available at
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/PubReprovals/Haugner PubR 041194.doc.; Mary
Wisniewski, Watching the Watchdogs Watch: The JIB and Courts Commission,
CHI. L., Mar. 1999, at 63 (reporting disparaging remarks by judges against Danes
and Yugoslavians); Feiden, supra note 167, at 4 (reporting on judge's Anglophobic
tirade against defendant of British ancestry)).
Spring 2011 141
142 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 31-1
alienage,170 socio-economic status,' 7' prosecution or
defense in criminal cases,172 and attitudes towards various
organizations;173
* identifying and dealing with personality conflicts
(e.g., with other judges,174 parties,1'7 or among lawyers,
jurors,176 etc.);
170 Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.154 (citing H.G. Reza & Christine
Hanley, Migrant Gets a New Trial; Judge Scolded, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at BI
(reporting that judge displayed such overt bias against undocumented aliens that
appeals panel found manifest miscarriage ofjustice)).
"7 Cf Gorenstein, 434 N.W.2d 603, 603 (Wis. 1989) (noting that judge
berated women with minor children for abusing the welfare system); Miller, supra
note 18, at 446 n.155, 447 n.158 (citing In re Michelson, 591 N.W.2d 843, 844
(Wis. 1999) (noting panel's finding that judge's comments demonstrated bias based
on socioeconomic status); Alisa Lapolt, Reprimand, Training Urged for Racine
Judge Over Unwed Mother Remarks, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 2, 1998, at 3
(reporting judge remarking, "I suppose it was too much to ask that your daughter
keep her pants on and not behave like a slut.")).
172 Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 441 n.90, 445 nn.141-42 (citing, inter alia, In
re Duckman, 677 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (1998) (holding that judge improperly
dismissed charges against criminal defendants and verbally humiliated
prosecutors); Feiden, supra note 167, at 4 (reporting that judge told prosecutor who
collapsed with chest pains not to "take it so personally"); Ralph Ranalli & Joanna
Weiss, Friends Say Lopez Will Quit Bench, BOsTON GLOBE, May 15, 2003, at Al
(reporting that judge displayed bias against prosecutors); John Caher, Agency 's
Authority to Act Under "Spargo" Clarified: Prosecutions for Behavior on the
Bench May Proceed, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 2003, at 1 (reporting that judge had been
accused of "denying assigned counsel, setting unreasonably high bail, coercing
guilty pleas, [and] entering convictions against defendants who were not before
him"); Janan Hanna, Outspoken Judge Will Take Class to Curb Anger, CHI. TRIB.,
May 9, 2002, at 1 (reporting that judge interrupted defense lawyer's closing
arguments forty-five times and suggested that the defense witnesses were thieves
and drug addicts); David Rosenzweig, Judge Removed From Case Over Remark,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at BI (reporting that judge questioned the credibility of
criminal defendants who testified in their own defense)).
' Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 446 n.149, 447 n.162 (citing Steele, supra note
165, at 32 (reporting prejudicial remark against labor unions); Stephen Hunt,
Remarks by a Judge Upset Attorney, ACLU, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 16, 2002, at Cl
(reporting prejudicial remarks against ACLU); William Kleinknecht, Appeals
Court Finds Bias Against Automaker-Cites Judge's "Antagonism" in Case of
Accident that Left Teen Paraplegic, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), June 4, 2003, at 41
(reporting prejudice against automobile manufacturers)).
174 Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 444 n.126 (citing, inter alia, In re Crawford,
629 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Wis. 2001) (suspending judge who threatened to publicize
* basic techniques of docket management;' 77
* basic techniques of managing people, especially
those with large personalities (including, but not limited
to, lawyers) in the courtroom and in chambers;
* balancing the needs of judicial office with pre-
existing friendships, 7 8 family obligations,'79 professional
purported evidence of misconduct by chief judge); In re Jones, 581 N.W.2d 876,
883 (Neb. 1998) (removing from office judge who engaged in a pattern of serious
misconduct, including saying "flick you" to a fellow judge and calling her a
"bitch"); In re Velasquez, No. 139 (Cal. Comm'n on Jud. Performance, Apr. 16,
1997) (censuring judge who made public statements disparaging fellow judges),
available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensureRTF/VelasquezCNCN_04-16- 97.rtf)).
.. Cf John Caher, Utterly Inexcusable Acts Prompt Censure of N.Y. Judge,
LEG. INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 5, 2006, at 4 (reporting that N.Y. Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct declined to suspend Albany city judge who on one occasion "descended
from the bench, dropped his robes to the floor and seemingly challenged a
defendant to a fist fight in court" and on another "suggested police officers 'thump
the shit out of another allegedly disrespectful individual").
"6 Cf Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119 n.2 (1983) (acknowledging, in case
where juror had two unrecorded, ex parte contacts with trial judge that she was
acquainted with murder victim of police informant witness, "that the trial judge
promptly should have notified counsel for all parties after the juror approached
him."); Johnson, 915 F.2d at 897 (noting "it would have been preferable for [the
trial judge] to have had Johnson and his counsel present during the conversation
with [the] juror . . . or at least to have recorded the conversation and disclosed its
substance to Johnson and his counsel.").
"7 Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 453 n.234 (citing, inter alia, In re Waddick,
605 N.W.2d 861, 862-63, 868 (Wis. 2000) (suspending judge for falsely claiming
that his docket was up-to-date when he was behind on numerous cases); In re
Johnson, 692 So. 2d 168, 170, 172 (Fla. 1997) (removing from office judge who
repeatedly backdated DUI convictions in order to disguise how long she was taking
to dispose of cases)).
178 Cf Richard Marosi, State Agency Admonishes Former Judge, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2000, at B4 (reporting public rebuke of judge who improperly released or
reduced bail on six criminal defendants who were clients of judge's old friend or
the friend's daughter).
179 Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 433 n.15, 438 n.64 (citing, inter alia, Wren
Propp, Court Suspends Mora Magistrate, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 10, 2003, at 6
(reporting suspension of judge who dismissed traffic citations on behalf of family
and friends); In re Schwartz, No. 01 CC-3 (Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., Nov. 30, 2001)
(discussing case of judge who allegedly pressured the Southern Illinois University
School of Law to admit his stepson and, when the application was denied,
retaliated by banning students from the school's clinic from representing clients in
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relationships,180 romantic attachments,' 81 and affiliations
with or memberships in religious,182 professional, civic,
and community organizations;
* some of the fine points of judicial ethics;' 83
* balancing judicial independence and judicial
restraint;
* financial planning: how to "afford" to be a
judge;' 84
* public perceptions and the importance of judicial
decorum;"'
his court), complaint summary available at http://
www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm).
180 Cf Miller, supra note 18, at 450 n.200 (citing, inter alia, In re Durr, No. 72
CC-I (Ill. Jud. Inquiry Bd., Aug. 1, 1973) (suspending judge for failing to disclose
to litigants that opposing counsel was judge's business partner), complaint
summary available at http://www.state.il.us/jib/summary.htm)).
1' Cf Deming, 736 P.2d at 653-54 (detailing judge's attempt to use his office
improperly to secure career advancement for paramour); Miller, supra note 18, at
436 n.47 (citing In re Chrzanowski, 636 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Mich. 2001) (involving
judge who appointed her paramour to represent indigent criminal defendants at
state expense without disclosing relationship to opposing counsel)).
182 Cf Fletcher v. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 968 P.2d 958, 971 (Cal.
1998) (involving judge who encouraged defendant in family law matter to attend a
religious men's fellowship meeting at judge's own house, during which the
defendant's personal problems became a focal point for discussion).
183 Cf United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 107-17 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(rebuking U.S. district judge who had presided over Microsoft antitrust trial for
"deliberate, repeated, egregious, and flagrant" talking with reporters about the
case); In re Buckson, 610 A.2d 203, 205-06 (Del. Jud. 1992) (censuring and
removing from office for "persistent" and "wilful" misconduct judge who, without
resigning his position, publicly announced he was seeking his party's nomination
for governor); Miller, supra note 18, at 450 n.200, 452 n.215, (citing, inter alia, In
re Forde, No. 96-311 (Ark. Jud. Discipline and Disability Comm'n, Sept. 22, 1998)
(finding violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct where judge failed to disclose
that he leased office space to an attorney who appeared before him), available at
http:/ www.state.ar.us/jddc/pdf/sanctions/Ford96.311 .pdf; In re Chirlin (Cal.
Comm'n on Jud. Performance, Aug. 28, 1995) (involving trial judge who, after
presiding over breach of contract action between actress and movie studio in which
the studio prevailed, but while the matter was on appeal, attended premiere of film
and postpremiere reception as studio's guest), available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdmRTF/ChirlinPA_08-28-95.rtf).
'8 See supra notes 104-106.
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* dealing with threats to personal safety and security
and that of court personnel and loved ones;' 86
* determining when recusal is advisable, even where
it is not mandatory;' 87
185 Cf Scott Glover, Judge Grants a Stay After Conceding He Maintained His
Own Website with Sexually Explicit Images, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 2008, at 1
(reporting that Chief Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, who was presiding
as a trial judge in an obscenity case, acknowledged posting sexual content on his
personal website, including "a photo of naked women on all fours painted to look
like cows and a video of a half-dressed man cavorting with a sexually aroused farm
animal. He defended some of the adult content as 'funny' but conceded that other
postings were inappropriate."). To his credit, Kozinski recused himself from the
obscenity trial amidst uproar over the pornographic material on his website. Scott
Glover, U.S. Judge in Obscenity Trial Steps Down, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at
1. See also In re Hamilton, PA. L. WKLY., June 25, 2007, at D8 (reporting decision
that magisterial district judge was subject to discipline for provoking a fistfight
with a police officer at a local golf club party and then telling the officer's wife to
"pick your piece of shit husband off the floor;" court held "reasonable expectations
of the public would include the expectation that a judicial officer would not act
lawlessly in provoking a fistfight . .. and then commit assault and battery on a
member of the local community").
1" Cf Appellate Court Upholds Matt Hale Conviction, CHI. TRIB., May 31,
2006, at C3 (reporting affirmance of conviction of white supremacist on charges of
soliciting murder of federal Judge Joan Lefkow). Judge Lefkow herself was not
assassinated, but her mother and husband were, and this led to installation of home
security systems by the U.S. Marshal's Service for most federal judges in Chicago.
See Jeff Coen, Judges Get Home Security, Le/kow Slayings Spur Expansion of
Measures to Safeguard Jurists, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 2006, at Cl. Subsequently,
however, the efforts of the U.S. Marshal's service have come under harsh attack.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE UNITED
STATES MARSHAL'S SERVICE JUDICIAL SECURITY PROCESS (Sept. 2007), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/USMS/e07l0/final.pdf (criticizing lax efforts
of U.S. Marshal's service to improve investigation of threats against federal judges
and protection of those threatened).
' This is a subject that has traditionally contained many gray areas. See, e.g.,
Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge's
Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned", 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55
(2000); Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron,
37 UNIV. OF MICH. J. L. REFORM 1017, 1118 n.395 (2004). Note that Canon 3(E) of
the 1990 version (which remains the version still in force in the several states) of
the A.B.A.'s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (1990), has been substantively revised in the version
approved by the A.B.A. House of Delegates on February 12, 2007. See MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.11 (2007). SCJI is currently working on a
Judicial Disqualification Project, which, when completed, will have surveyed the
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* balancing First Amendment rights against the
needs of judicial discretion in election campaigning,' 8 8
public speaking, relations with news media, and
responding to public criticism of decisions.
The foregoing does not purport to be an exhaustive list; it is
merely a set of suggestions for discussion and debate on the
structuring of a pilot IJE program. Such a program need not be a
year-long, formal academic curriculum leading to the awarding of an
advanced degree but can be accomplished in a flexible format, with a
maximum anticipated duration of one or two weeks, which could be
covered in a single session (e.g., a summer session) or seriatim in a
number of one- to two-day (or perhaps even weekend) seminars.
Individual state bar associations are well-positioned to sponsor IJE
for their membership, and to experiment with the structure and
content of such programs. In this way, they can serve Justice
most significant standards in use across the country and will propose
recommendations to the ABA House of Delegates for endorsement.
The Supreme Court's granting of certiorari in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., No. 08-22, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008), has resulted in a surge of
public interest in the special problem of recusal relating to judicial election
Campaign contributions. A recent poll, conducted by Harris International February
12-15, 2009 on behalf of the Justice at Stake Campaign, found that 81 percent of
those surveyed (slightly in excess of 1000 individuals) believe judges should not
decide whether they themselves should hear a case, and that when a judge's
impartiality is challenged, another judge should weigh the facts. Some 68 percent
would doubt a judge's impartiality if one party to a case had contributed $50,000 to
the judge's election campaign, and that number rose to 73% if the campaign
contribution level were at $1 million. See 2/22/09: Poll: Huge Majority Wants
Firewall Between Judges, Election Backers, available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org//node/125.
188 "When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct
campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for competition among
interest groups and political parties, the persisting question is whether that process
is consistent with the perception and the reality of judicial independence and
judicial excellence." N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez-Torres, 552 U.S. 196,
212 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Cf Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding that First Amendment prohibits the states from
gagging candidates for judicial office on issues of public debate); Spargo v. New
York State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 88-90 (N.D.N.Y.
2003) (invalidating state judicial conduct regulations prohibiting judicial candidates
from engaging in political activity).
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Brandeis' oft-quoted "states as laboratories" function,' 89 with the
ultimate goal of populating the judiciary of the future with men and
women who will potentially be more sensitive to the demands and
responsibilities of serving as a judge, more attuned to the central
importance of public perceptions of the judiciary as a barometer of
the legitimacy of judicial review, and more consciously committed to
fulfilling the ideals of the fair and impartial administration of justice
for all.
V. CONCLUSION
Though by no means free from all doubt and worthy of careful
scrutiny under the magnifying glass of healthy skepticism, there
seems to be a persuasive case that can be made for voluntary,
additional education for lawyers aspiring to, or considering the
possibility of someday seeking, judicial office. The goal of such
education would be to advance the, cause of professionalism by
improving the overall quality of the pool of people seeking election
or appointment to the bench. Individual state bar associations will be
able to take leading roles in fashioning the optimal format and
curriculum of such a program for their individual jurisdictions and
fostering the ideals of fair and impartial courts that have long been
the hallmark of our legal system.
'
89 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (noting with approval states serving as laboratories for trying "novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country").
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